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Vincent Kazmierski* Something to Talk About: Is There a
Charter Right to Access Government
Information?
Can sections 2(b) and 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms be
interpreted to protect a constitutional right of access to government information?
The author argues that the constitutional principle of democracy provides a
foundation for judicial recognition of such a constitutional right of access even
though the inclusion of an explicit right to access to government information was
rejected during the process of drafting the Charter Given that the Supreme Court
of Canada's section 2(b) and 3 jurisprudence has been informed by the principle
of democracy, the application of the principle may now guide the Court to include
protection of access to government information in its evolving interpretation of
those. Charter rights. Finally, a hypothetical case is considered in order to outline
ways in which a constitutional right to access may be justifiably limited.
Le paragraphe 2(b) et Particle 3 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes
peuvent-ils 6tre interprdt6s de fagon proteger un droit constitutionnel d'acc~s aux
renseignements d6tenus par le gouvernement? L'auteur pretend que le principe
constitutionnel de d6mocratie constitue un fondement pour la reconnaissance
judiciaire d'un tel droit constitutionnel d'acces, meme si I'inclusion d'un droit
explicite d'acces aux renseignements dutenus par le gouvemement a 6t6 refus6e
au moment de la redaction de la Charte. Etant donn6 que les arr6ts de la Cour
supreme du Canada concernant le paragraphe 2(b) et 'article 3 de la Charte
s'appuient sur le principe de democratie, I'application du principe peut desormais
guider la Cour et I'inciter J inclure la protection de I'acces aux renseignements
detenus par le gouvernement dans son interpretation dvolutive des droits garantis
par la Charte; Enfin, I'auteur 6tudie une situation hypoth6tique pour illustrer des
fagons dont un droit constitutionnel d'acc~s pourrait 6tre restreint de fagon
justifiable.
* Vincent Kazmierski, B.A. (Jt. Hons.), M.A., LL.B., S.J.D., Assistant Professor, Department of
Law, Carleton University. This article is based, in part, on my doctoral thesis. As such, the article
benefitted from comments on my thesis from Lorraine Weinrib, Sujit Choudhry, Patrick Macklem,
Ed Morgan, and Mark Walters. This article, in particular, also benefitted from the comments of David
Elliott, Wayne MacKay, Leah Grimmer, and the anonymous reviewers from Dalhousie Law Journal.
My thanks to you all.
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Introduction
I. The promise of access: recognizing the importance of access to
government information in Canada
II. Roles for unwritten constitutional principles in constitutional
interpretation
III. Where is the "access gap" in the Canadian Constitution?
IV. Why should judges fill the access gap in the Constitution instead of
legislatures?
V. How can the principle of democracy help to fill the access gap in
the Constitution?
VI. Hypothetical scenario: applying the Charter to protect access to
cabinet confidences
Conclusion
Introduction
Access to government information has become a foundation of
modem democratic governance. Over the past fifty years, both courts
and legislatures in Canada have increasingly recognized the importance
of access to government information in maintaining the openness and
accountability that is crucial for our democratic order. In the judicial realm,
developments in the common law have eroded the power of governments
to shield documents from disclosure in litigation. In the legislative realm,
laws have been introduced by all levels of government to facilitate access
to government information. In the process of interpreting such access to
information legislation, courts have steadfastly insisted that limitations on
access must be narrowly construed in order to promote the primary purpose
of these acts, namely protecting the access to information necessary
to ensure government accountability and the political participation of
citizens.
Notwithstanding the near universal recognition of its importance as a
cornerstone of effective democratic governance, the protection of access
to government information remains ' .-ious in Canada. Bureaucratic
resistance, sometimes unscrupulous (u.,1 unsupervised) exercise of
administrative discretion and regressive legislative amendments have all
been identified as potential threats to our access to information concerning
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government activity.' This article explores the degree to which these
threats may be countered by constitutionally-grounded protections. In
particular, I argue that the constitutional principle of democracy provides
the necessary foundation for the constitutional protection of access to
government information through sections 2(b) and 3 of the Charter.2
I begin by considering the ways in which the importance of access to
government information has been recognized in principle by academics,
parliamentarians and others both in Canada and abroad. I then proceed to
consider how this principled recognition of the importance of access to
government information may be supplemented by practical, constitutional
protection through the interpretation and application of sections 2(b)
and 3 of the Charter. In particular, I address three major questions
raised by previous judicial decisions that have rejected recognition of a
constitutional right to access government information: (1) Where is the
access gap in the Constitution? (2) Why should judges fill the access gap.
instead of legislatures? (3) How can the principle of democracy help to fill
the access gap in the Constitution?
1. See, e.g. Information Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report 2003-2004 (Ottawa: Minister of
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004) [Information Commissioner of Canada, 2003-
2004] at 3. The Information Commissioner of Canada expressed his continuing concern in his 2004-
2005 Annual Report: Annual Report 2004-2005 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 2004). In 2007, the newly appointed Information Commissioner, Robert Marleau,
echoed the concerns raised by previous commissioners. He stated: "Despite much progress since 1983,
there remain impediments to the full realization of Parliament's intent as expressed in the [Access Act].
Too often, responses to access requests are late, incomplete, or overly-censored. Too often, access is
denied to hide wrongdoing, or to protect officials or governments from embarrassment, rather than to
serve a legitimate confidentiality requirement." Information Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report,
2006-2007 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2007) at 11. See
also, Canada, Access to Information Review Task Force, Access to Information: Making it Work for
Canadians (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2002) at 44; Information Commissioner
of Canada, "Remarks to House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (Bill
C-36)" (October 23, 2001), online: Information Commissioner of Canada http://www.infocom.gc.ca/
speeches/speechview-e.asp?intspeechld=6 1; Information Commissioner of Canada, "Remarks to the
University of Alberta's 2006 Access and Privacy Conference's Appreciation Dinner- "The Future of
Accountability - the Federal Government's Accountability Act and Discussion Paper and the Open
Government Act" (June 14, 2006), online: Information Commissioner of Canada <http://www.infocom.
gc.ca/speeches/speechview-e.asp?intSpeechld=1 28&bln Printtru.> at 9ff; Information Commissioner
of Canada, Proposed Changes to the Access to Information Act: Presentation to the Committee on
Access to Information, Privacy And Ethics (Ottawa: Information Commissioner of Canada, 2005),
online: Information Commissioner of Canada <http://www.infocom.gc.ca/specialreports/2005reform-
e.asp>. For judicial commentary, see: Canadian Council of Christian Charities v. Canada, [1994] 4
F.C. 245 at 255; Information Commissioner v. Minister of the Environment, [2001] 3 F.C. 514 (T.D.);
3430901 Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry), 2001 FCA 254, [2002] I F.C. 42 1, at para 30;
Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Commissioner of the'R. C.MP) 2003 SCC 8, [2003]
1 S.C.R. 66 at para 17.
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, ss. 2(b) and 3 [Charter].
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Each of these questions involves a consideration of the role of the
principle of democracy in the interpretation of sections 2(b) and 3 of the
Charter. In response to the first and second questions, I consider how
reliance on the unwritten principle of democracy as an interpretive aid
may be justified even though the inclusion of an explicit right to access to
government information was rejected during the process of drafting the
Charter. In response to the third question, I consider the ways in which the
Supreme Court of Canada's section 2(b) and 3 jurisprudence has already
been informed by the principle of democracy and how application of
the principle may now guide the Court to include protection of access
to government information in its evolving interpretation of those Charter
rights.
Finally, I considerthe way in which the arguments in favour of protecting
the right to access may be weighed against other values such as the need
to protect the efficacy of government decision-making processes. More
specifically, I consider how such a right to access government information
may be applied to challenge the mandatory exemption of Cabinet secrets
from disclosure under Ontario access legislation and the arguments that
may be advanced to justify such a limitation of a constitutional right to
access.
I. The promise of access: recognizing the importance of access to
government information in Canada
Access to government information has not always been recognized as an
important element of the democratic process in Canada. At the time of
Confederation, the concept of providing the public access to government
information was an unfamiliar one to say the least. This is not surprising
given that the concept of representative government was still in its infancy
in the former colony and the scope of government remained, by modem
standards, infinitesimal. Over time, access to government information has
become more important as the role of government has expanded and as
citizens' expectations of participation in, and accountability of, the process
of governance have increased. In particular, recognition of the need to
protect access to government information has grown dramatically since
the end of the Second World War and the corresponding expansion of
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government activity in the past half-century.3 By the late 1970s, Canadian
politicians started to acknowledge the need to provide access to government
information, leading ultimately to the enactment of the federal Access to
Information Act in June 1982. 4 All provinces and territories now have
some form of legislation protecting access to government information.5
The fundamental argument in favour of access to government
information that has been advanced by academics,6 government
3. For a discussion of this process, see: Alasdair Roberts, "Structural Pluralism and the Right to
Information" (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 243 at 259-60 [Roberts, "Structural Pluralism"]. Roberts has argued
in general terms that a constitutional right to access government information could be linked to the
right to freedom of expression and the right to vote. This article will provide a more detailed and
specific argument demonstrating how existing Canadian jurisprudence may be interpreted to support
the recognition of a constitutional right to access government information in Canada through the
application of the constitutional principle of democracy.
4. R.S.C. 1985, c. A-I [Access Act]. The Act came into force on July 1, 1983.
5. Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.L. 2002, c. A-I.1; Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 5; Freedom of Information and Protection
ofPrivacyAct, S.P.E.I. 2001, c. 37; Right to Information Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. R- 10.3; An Act respecting
Access to Documents held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, R.S.Q. c.
A-2. 1; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1; Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.M. 1997, c. 50; Freedom of Information and Protection
of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A.
2000, c. F-25; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165; Access
to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Nunavut), S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20; Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act (Nunavu), S.N.W.T. 1994, c.20; Access to Information and Protection
of Privacy Act, R.S.Y. c. 1.
6. Donald C. Rowat, "How Much Administrative Secrecy?" (1965) 31 Can. J. Econ. Polit. Sc. 479 at
480. Rowat argued: "Parliament and the public cannot hope to call the Government to account without
an adequate knowledge of what is going on; nor can they hope to participate in the decision-making
process and contribute their talents to the formation of policy and legislation if that process is hidden
from view." A similar sentiment was expressed by T. Murray Rankin in 1977, when he wrote: "The
right to confront the decision-making apparatus of the State with informed opinions is the foundation
of liberal democracies... Access to government information is essential to participatory democracy." T.
Murray Rankin, Freedom of Information in Canada: Will the Doors Stay Shut? (Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association, 1977) [Rankin, FOI in Canada] at 154-155. In 1979, the Canadian BarAssociation (CBA)
proposed a model freedom of information bill. The CBA stated: "[tihe citizen's ability to participate
depends directly upon the amount of information at his disposal." Canadian Bar Association, Freedom
of Information in Canada: A Model Bill (Ottawa: CBA, March 1979) at 6. For similar arguments, see,
for instance: Roberts, "Structural Pluralism", supra note 3 at 263; Robert Tardi, The Law of Democratic
Governing: Principles (Vol. 1) (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) at 38; Craig Forcese, "Clouding
Accountability: Canada's Government Secrecy and National Security Law "Complex" (2004-2005)
36 Ottawa L. Rev. 49 at paras. 30-31. Other academic discussions of the importance of access to
government information to democratic governance include: Donald G. Rowat, ed., The Making of the
Federal Access Act: A Case Study of Policy-Making in Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University, Dept.
of Political Science, 1985); John D. McCamus, ed., Freedom of Information: Canadian Perspectives
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1981); T. Murray Rankin, "The New Access to Information and Privacy Act:
A Critical Annotation" (1983) 15 Ottawa L. Rev. 1. For a general discussion of the evolution of access
to information legislation in Canada at the federal level see, Tom Onyshko, "The Federal Court and
the Access to Information Act" (1993) 22 Man. L.J. 73.
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commissions,7 law reform commissions,8 government Green papers9
7. Ontario, Report of the Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy, Public
Government for, Private People (Toronto: Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual
Privacy 1980). The Commission, commonly known as the Williams Commission, noted the importance
of ensuring that citizens have sufficient information concerning government, stating: "... there is no
question that an informed citizenry, one that has access to government-held information, is better able
to make effective use of the means of expression of public opinion on political questions." Ibid at
78.
8. Australian Law Reform Commission, Open Government: a review of the federal Freedom of
Information Act, 1982, online: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/77/ >
[Open Government Report]. The Open Government Report underlined that the fundamental reason for
providing access to government information is "to ensure open and accountable government." (s. 2.2).
It described the link between representative democracy and access to government information, stating
at (s. 2.3). :
Australia is a representative democracy. The Constitution gives the people ultimate control
over the government, exercised through the election of the members of Parliament. The
effective operation of representative democracy depends on the people being able
to scrutinize, discuss and contribute to government decision making. To do this,
they need information. While much material about government operations is provided
voluntarily and legislation must be published, the FOI Act has an important role to play in
enhancing the proper working of our representative democracy by giving individuals the
right to demand that specific documents be disclosed. Such access to information permits
the government to be assessed and enables people to participate more effectively in
the policy and decision making processes of the government...
Without information, people cannot adequately exercise their rights and responsibilities
as citizens or make informed choices. Government information is a national resource. Its
availability and dissemination are important for the economic and social well-being of
society generally. [Emphasis added]
See also, Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of the Official Information Act (Report 40)
(Wellington: Law Commission, 1997), online: Law Commission of New Zealand <http://www.
lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication 42_118_R40.pdf> [Report 40]; and U.K.,
Your Right to Know: The Governments Proposals for a Freedom of Information Act (London: Her
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1997), online: Freedom of Information White Paper <http:www.archive.
official-documents.co.uk/document/caboff/foi/foi.htm>.
9. Hon. John Roberts, Secretary of State, Legislation on Public Access to Government Documents
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, June 1977). In this Green Paper, which preceded
the introduction of the federal Access Act the government noted that: "Open government is the basis
of democracy." It should be noted that this Green Paper was criticized as including too many proposed
restrictions on access to government information. See, e.g. Tom Onyshko, "The Federal Court and the
Access to Information Act," (1993) 22 Man. L.J. 73. at 78. T. Murray Rankin criticized the Green Paper,
stating: " ... by the paucity of its analysis, the blurring of its stated options, and the misrepresentation
of the goals and practices of freedom of information legislation, the Green Paper leaves little doubt
that meaningful legislation will not be forthcoming." T. Murray Rankin, Freedom of Information in
Canada: Will the Doors Stay Shut? (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1977) at 133.
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parliamentary committees, ° and government task force reports" may
be summarized as follows. Democracy is based on the right of citizens
to participate in the process of governance. The size of most modem
democracies precludes large-scale direct participation in the process of
governance. As such, the primary aspect of this citizen participation is
the process of selecting those candidates who will govern on behalf of the
citizens. Citizens select these candidates on the basis of their proposed
policies or programs of government and, in the case of incumbent
candidates, on the basis of their performance in government. In order to
ensure that citizens can participate effectively in the democratic process,
they require information about the proposed policies of the candidates
for public office and about the performance of the government. Access to
this information allows citizens to make informed choices when voting. It
allows them to hold the government accountable for its actions.
In short, political participation requires more than just a right to
discuss political ideas; it also requires a right to an informed discussion
that includes information about the actions taken by government. Access
10. Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General on the Review of the
Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, Open and Shut: Enhancing the Right to Know and
the Right to Privacy (Ottawa: Queen's Printer of Canada, 1987) [Open and Shut]. In the introduction
to its review of the federal Access Act, the Standing Committee noted that the general principle
underlying the report was "the conviction shared by all parliamentarians that Canadian democracy
is strengthened by making government, its bureaucracy and its agencies accountable to the electorate
and by protecting the rights of individuals against possible abuse." (at 2). The Committee explained
the role of protections for access to government information in ensuring the movement towards greater
accountability of governments, stating:
The development of access legislation is part of a widespread 'open govemment' movement
in democratic societies. Democracies are strengthened by the ability of electorates to hold
decision makers responsible for their policies and actions. Access legislati6n is one element
of this general trend toward greater accountability. (at 4) [citations omitted].
11. Government of Canada, Access and Privacy: The Steps Ahead (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services, 1987) at 29. In this response to the Open and Shut report, the Canadian government
explicitly recognized the importance of access to government information in furthering government
accountability and public participation in the political process. It stated:
The government recognizes that Canadians need access to a wide range of information
about their government. There is a compelling public interest in openness, to ensure that
the government is fully accountable for its goals and that its performance can measured
against these goals. (sic) This renders the government more accountable to the electorate
and facilitates informed public participation in the formulation of public policy. It ensures
fairness in government decision-making and permits the airing and reconciliation of
divergent views across the country.
See also, Canada, Access to Information Review Task Force, Access to Information: Making it Work
for Canadians (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2002). In the introduction to its 2002
report, the Access to Information Review Task Force noted .the impact of the September I 11 attacks,
but went on to emphasize tie continued importance of access to information to Canadian society. It
noted that: "... the tragedy has also made us more aware than ever that democracy and openness are
fundamental values of the society we all want to live in." (at 1).
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to government information provides access to contextual information that
allows a meaningful evaluation of political ideas, policies and conduct.
It supplements the right to political speech with a right to political
information; it supplements a right to talk with a right to have something
to talk about.
Unfortunately, the principled recognition of the importance of access
has not always translated into protection in practice. Notwithstanding the
existence of seemingly robust legislative access regimes, concerns about
government resistance against access requests and, in some cases access
rights, remain. Is there a way to fortify our existing access rights? Is there
a way to match the principled recognition of the importance of access to
government information with the practical protection of that access? Is a
higher order of constitutional protection available?
A strict, literal reading of the text of the Canadian Constitution would
suggest not. A right to access to government information is not explicitly
included in the text of the Constitution. However, there is nothing strict
or literal about the prevailing methods of interpreting the Canadian
Constitution. As such, it is arguable that constitutional protection for access
to government information is not dependent on an explicit constitutional
provision outlining a right of access. Instead, constitutional protection of
such a right of access may be rooted in a broader interpretation of the
Constitution and of the protection afforded by the Constitution to the
democratic process through sections 2(b) and 3 of the Charter.
At the outset it must be recognized that, at least until very recently,
courts in Canada have been reluctant to recognize access to government
information as part of the scope of the protection afforded by the Charter.
In particular, Canadian courts have resisted claims that s. 2(b) protects a
right to access information pertaining to the financial funding provided to
a particular criminal investigation,1 2 to access data concerning criminal
12. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 197 (Div. Ct.) [Fineberg]. Fineberg
related to a request for disclosure made by the respondent newspaper reporter of the Ministry of
the Attorney General. Fineberg requested information pertaining to the financial funding provided
to a particular criminal investigation. The Minister refused disclosure based on section 14 of the
Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 [FOIPPA], which
permitted a head of department to refuse disclosure of information in certain categories. The inquiry
officer of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered the Ministry to disclose much
of the requested information, but held that some of the information was not relevant to Fineberg's
request.
The Ministry applied for judicial review of the inquiry officer's decision. Fineberg cross-
appealed, arguing, in part, that certain provisions of FOIPPA violated s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. The Divisional Court dismissed the Ministry's application and allowed the
cross-appeal in part. However, the.Divisional Court rejected Fineberg's argument that section 2(b) of
the Charter included a right to access government information.
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offenders, 3 to access sealed records of a meeting between a debtor and
his receiver14 and to access records of an investigation of the conduct of
Crown attorneys and police officers in a failed murder investigation and
trial.I5
In the argument that follows, I will demonstrate how the objections to
recognizing constitutional protection for access to government information
raised in these cases may be overcome. In particular, I will demonstrate how
the principle of democracy may provide the foundation for the recognition
of a constitutional right to access government information in ss. 2(b) and 3
of the Charter. To make this argument, I will have to address three major
concerns that have been raised in the cases thus far. The first question
is: why should constitutional protection be extended beyond a strict
interpretation of the existing written constitutional provisions that have
been designed to protect the democratic process. In more colloquial terms:
where is the access gap in the Canadian Constitution? A question of equal
importance is: if a gap is identified, why should the courts fill it instead of
the legislature? Finally, assuming that an access gap can be identified, the
third question raised is: how can the principle of democracy help to fill the
access gap in the Constitution? Put another way, how may the principle of
democracy inform the interpretation of existing Charter provisions in a
way that moves beyond the limits of the existing jurisprudence?
I will address these questions below. However, before doing so, it is
worth briefly reviewing the Supreme Court of Canada's discussion of the
role of unwritten constitutional principles in the process of constitutional
interpretation.
13. Yeager v. Canada (Correctional Service) (2003), 223 D.L.R. (4 ') 234 (Fed. C.A.) [Yeager].
Yeager involved a claim that the Correctional Service of Canada infringed the applicant's s. 2(b)
Charter right by refusing to produce certain data concerning offenders, a code book necessary to
interpret the data and a copy of software used to compile the data. The Correctional Service refused to
provide the data on the basis that it would interfere with the operation of the facility concerned.
14. National Bank of Canada v. Melnitzer(1991), 5 O.R. (3d) 234 (Gen. Div.) [Melnitzer]. Melnitzer
concerned an order sealing the minutes of the meeting between Melnitzer and the receiver of his
assets, undertakings and businesses. A newspaper moved to have the sealing order set aside, arguing
that the order infringed the right to freedom of the press entrenched in s. 2(b) of the Charter. Justice
Killeen found that the order should be varied, but rejected the applicant newspaper's argument that s.
2(b) had been infringed.
15. Criminal Lawyers Association v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security) (2004), 70 O.R.
(3d) 332 (Ont. Div. Ct), rev'd 2007 ONCA 392, 280 D.L.R. (41') 193 [Criminal Lawyers Association],
leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 382. The case was heard by the S.C.C. on 8
December 2008. The court reserved its decision. This case is discussed in more detail below.
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II. Roles for unwritten constitutional principles in constitutional
interpretation
The Supreme Court of Canada has identified a number of different roles
that may be fulfilled by unwritten constitutional principles. In the Quebec
Secession Reference, the Court emphasized that unwritten principles may
assist "in the interpretation of the text and the delineation of spheres of
jurisdiction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the role of political
institutions." 6
Assisting in the interpretation of the written provisions of the
Constitution is perhaps the least contentious of the roles of unwritten
principles. The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a generous approach
to the interpretation of the law of the Constitution. The two guiding
principles of this approach are that the Constitution as a whole must be
interpreted broadly (as a living tree capable of growth within its natural
limits) and that the rights protection provisions of the Charter, in particular,
should be interpreted in a purposive manner "in light of the interest [they
were] meant to protect". 7 This method of interpretation is "aimed at
fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full
benefit of the Charter s protection."'
8
This approach to interpretation of the written text is based on the
assumption that the terms of the text should not be frozen in time, but rather
should be allowed to grow and change in order to meet the needs of an
evolving society. ' 9 It is also based on the expectation that the Constitution
ultimately will provide a comprehensive framework for governance. Not
surprisingly, the key to providing such a broad interpretation is to identify
the fundamental principles that underlie the more explicit provisions of
the text-to seek the "broader philosophy which is capable of explaining
the past and animating the future" in Chief Justice McLachlin's words. 0
As such, unwritten constitutional principles are not just necessary for the
identification of the current scope of rights and obligation or the current
roles of political institutions, they also have a vital role to play in the
development and evolution of the Constitution. As noted in the Quebec
Secession Reference: "observance of and respect for these principles
16. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4"h) 385 at para. 52 [Quebec
Secession Reference cited to S.C.R.].
17. R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at para. 116.
18. Ibid. at para. 117.
19. Ref re: Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, ss. 14, 20 (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, (1991),
81 D.L.R. (4") 16 at 32-33 [Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference, cited to D.L.R.].
20. Ibid.
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is essential to the ongoing process of constitutional development and
evolution of our Constitution as a 'living tree'. .. "2
The Court has emphasized the importance of the written provisions
of the Constitution, particularly the stabilizing effect of those provisions,
noting that "there are compelling reasons to insist upon the primacy of
our written Constitution. A written Constitution promotes legal certainty
and predictability, and it provides a foundation and a touchstone for the
exercise of constitutional judicial review. '22 Thus, the Court has noted that
unwritten principles may not "be taken as an invitation to dispense with
the written text of the Constitution."23 However, the majority of the Court
also agreed with then Chief Justice Lamer's finding in the Provincial
Judges Reference that the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 "invites
the courts to turn those principles into the premises of a constitutional
argument that culminates in the filling 6f gaps in the express terms of
the constitutional text. '24 As such, the Court has found that, in addition
to assisting in interpreting the text, unwritten principles may be used to
supplement the text in cases where the text does not provide a clear answer
to the issue to be determined.
How have Canadian courts reacted to these guidelines? Canadian courts
have insisted that unwritten constitutional principles cannot be relied upon
where there is no gap in the coverage provided by the written provisions
of the Constitution. Several cases are worthy of note in this regard. In
UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General),25 the appellant argued that
the principle of federalism should be applied to strike down a section of
the Dairy Products and Dairy Products Substitutes Act26 that authorized
the Quebec government to make regulations governing the colour of
margarine. In effect, the appellant argued that the provision violated the
principle of federalism because it prevented the free movement of yellow-
coloured margarine into the province of Quebec. The Quebec Court of
Appeal found that the appellant was effectively trying to import a right to
a common market into the Constitution. It refused to apply the principle of
21. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 16 at 410.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. at 411. See also, Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince
Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, (sub nom. Reference re: Public Sector Pay Reduction Act (P.E.I.),
s. 10 ), 150 D.L.R. (4"') 577 at 620-621 [Provincial Judges Reference cited to D.L.R.]; New Brunswick
Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House ofAssembly), [ 1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, 100 D.L.R.
(41h) 212 at 376 [New Brunswick Broadcasting cited to S.C.R.].
24. Provincial Judges Reference, ibid. at 626-27; Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 16 at
411.
25. (2003), 234 D.L.R. (4"') 398 [UL Canada Inc.].
26. R.S.Q., c. P-30, s.42.
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federalism in the case, finding that there was no constitutional gap to be
filled as ss. 91(2), 92(13)i 92(16) and 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867
provided the necessary framework of constitutional rulesto deal with the
issue. 27
Similarly, in Baie D 'Urfl (Ville) c. Qu~bec (Procureur Gnrao28,
the Quebec Court of Appeal refused to apply unwritten constitutional
principles to invalidate provincial legislation that abolished certain
municipalities while creating others. 29 The plaintiffs argued that, by
allowing the abolition of municipalities that were predominantly
populated by Anglophones, the legislation violated the principles of
protection of minority rights and the principle of federalism. The Quebec
Court of Appeal rejected this argument noting that the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate a gap. in the Constitution that could trigger reliance on
unwritten constitutional principles.3"
In particular, the Court of Appeal found that the mere fact that the issue
of whether provinces had the power to eliminate municipalities is not dealt
with expressly in the Constitution does not mean there is a constitutional
gap."H In the Court of Appeal's view, if the framers of the Constitution
had wanted to protect municipal institutions as opposed to e "icational or
religious institutions, they would have included such protection explicitly
in the text of the Constitution. To now apply unwritten constitutional
principles to protect Anglophone municipal institutions would amount to
rewriting history in the Court's mind.32
In addition to doubting that mere silence in the Constitution constitutes
a gap, Canadian judges have looked to the constitutional drafting process
to determine whether failure to protect a particular right is intentional as
opposed to unintentional. The best example of this is in respect to the
purposeful omission of protection of property rights in the Charter. In
27. UL Canada Inc., supra note 25 at paras. 65-71.
28. [2001] R.J.Q. 2520, 27 M.P.L.R. 173, (sub nom. Westmount (Ville) c. Quibec (Procureur
G~niral)) 108 A.C.W.S. (3d) 980 [Baie D 'Urfi], (leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed), [2001] 3 S.C.R.
xi.
29. Act to reform the municipal territorial organization of the metropolitan regions of Montreal,
Quebec and the Outaouais, S.Q. 2001, c. 25.
30. Baie D 'Urfl, supra note 28 at para. 92. The Court stated:
En r6alit6, ils invoquent ces principles, non pour combler des vides, mais bien pour mettre de
c6t6 ]a competence des provinces et enchdsser dans la Constitution de nouvelles obligations
linguistiques en mati~re municipale. Ils ignorent l'importance de la rdserve formulae par
la Cour supr6me qui pr6voit que la reconnaissance des principes non dcrits ne peut 8tre
interpretde comme constitutant une invitation i n~gliger le texte 6crit de la Constitution.
3 1. Ibid. at para 106. In the Court's words: "Le seul silence de la Constitution 6crite ne constitute pas
n~cessairement un vide."
32. Ibid. See also, Potterc. Quebec (Procureurgnra, [2001] J.Q. No. 5553 (C.A.).
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Irwin Toy,33 a majority of the Supreme Court specifically noted that the
exclusion of property rights from protection under section 7 of the Charter
could be contrasted to the inclusion of protection of such rights in the
American Bill of Rights. The majority found that the intentional exclusion
of protection of property from the express terms of section 7 meant that
protection of property rights should not be read into the Charter after the
fact.34 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has held that pure economic
rights are excluded from Charter protection.
The fact that property rights were intentionally excluded from the
Charter by the constitutional framers has been interpreted by some to
mean that the absence of property rights in the Constitution may not
be considered a gap in the coverage of the Constitution.35 However, we
shall see below that the impact of such exclusionary decisions in the
constitutional drafting process remains uncertain.
III. Where is the "access gap" in the Canadian constitution?
At the very least, the above cases suggest that any argument in favour of
identifying an access gap in the Canadian Constitution must consider both
those rights that have been expressly included in the written provisions
of the Constitution and the rights that have been purposefully excluded
from those written provisions. Where then, does access to government
information fit within the existing constitutional framework of protections
for the democratic process?
The scope of constitutional protection of the democratic process
has expanded over time. Sections 17, 20, and 50 were the most explicit
constitutional protections of democratic governance in the Constitution
33. Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] I S.C.R. 927 [Irwin Toy].
34. Ibid. at para. 96. The majority decision stated: "...The intentional exclusion of property from s.
7, and the substitution therefor of "security of the person" has, in our estimation, a dual effect. First,
it leads to a general inference that economic rights as generally encompassed by the term "property"
are not within the perimeters of the s. 7 guarantee. This is not to declare, however, that no fight with
an economic component can fall within "security of the person".
35. For example in Shaw v. Stein, [2004] SKQB 194 at para. 26, Justice Smith found that:
... the absence of property rights in the Charter is not a result of an oversight. The Charter
was bom out of protracted negotiations which generated numerous drafts. In the end there
was a conscious decision not to create constitutional protection for property rights as
exists in the Constitution of the United States of America or which were part of the earlier
Canadian Bill of Rights.
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Act, 1867.36 These provisions were supplemented by the Charter, which
included several new sections explicitly recognized as "democratic"
rights." These new Charter provisions, specifically sections 3, 4 and 5
of the Charter, are meant to ensure that our system of government is
more representative by guaranteeing that all citizens can participate in the
selection of representatives,37 that the representatives chosen by the citizens
will be called together every year to conduct the nation's business, 38 and
that the representatives will be held accountable at least every five years.3 9
The importance of these rights is underlined by the fact that they are not
included within the ambit of the override provision, s. 33 of the Charter.
The Charter also includes provisions protecting rights that have been
recognized as fundamental to the proper functioning of democracy.40 In
particular, section 2 of the Charter, which lists "fundamental freedoms",
protects freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media,
freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.
In light of these substantive constitutional protections, the argument
in favour of'recognizing a constitutional right of access to government
information must demonstrate that protection beyond the scope of the
current interpretation of these written provisions is merited. This-is precisely
the type of argument advanced by Chief Justice Lamer's majority reasons
in the Provincial Judges Reference.4' In that case, Chief Justice Lamer
found that the scope of protection afforded to the principle of judicial
independence must extend beyohd the then existing interpretation of
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and section 1 (d) of the Charter.
In his judgment, he found that the protection ofjudicial independence was
not limited to the strict terms of the text of the Constitution, but rather was
rooted in a broader unwritten principle. That unwritten principle mandated
36. Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 17, 20 and 50 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. 11, No. 5. Section 17 states: "There shall be One Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen,
an Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons". Section 20 stated: "There shall be
a Session of the Parliament of Canada once at least in every Year, so that Twelve Months shall not
intervene between the last Sitting of the Parliament in one Session and its first sitting in the next
Session." Section 20 was repealed by the Constitution Act, 1982 and replaced by section 5 of the
Charter. Section 50 states: "Every House of Commons shall continue for Five Years from the Day
of the Return of the Writs for choosing the House (subject to be sooner dissolved by the Governor
General), and no longer." Section 50 has been supplemented by s. 4 of the Charter.
37. Charter, supra note 2, s. 3.
38. Ibid., s. 5.
39. Ibid., s. 4.
40. Jeremy Kirk, "Constitutional Implications From Representative Democracy" (1995) 23 Fed. L.
Rev. 37 at 49-50.
41. Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 23.
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that the protection of judicial independence afforded by section 11 (d) of
the Charter be extended beyond judges dealing with criminal "offences",
as explicitly stated in the text of the section, to include also provincial
court judges not seized with criminal law matters.4 1
The argument advanced here is that the scope of the written provisions
of the Constitution (as they have been interpreted to date) is insufficient
to provide the necessary protection of the democratic process. As a
result, a gap has developed that must be filled through recourse to the
unwritten principle of democracy that underlies the written terms of the
Constitution. Several questions remain to be answered. The first is: what
has changed in the past twenty-five years to create a need for constitutional
protection that arguably was not recognized in 1982 when the scope of
explicit constitutional protection of the democratic process was extended
by entrenching ss. 2-5 of the Charter?
Here it is important to recall that the Special Joint Committee of
the Senate and the House of Commons charged with reviewing draft
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982 considered a motion to include
an explicit provision protecting a right to government information. The
motion proposed that a clause be inserted into the Charter as follows:
"Everyone has a right to have reasonable access to information under the
control of any institution of any government.
43
The acting Minister of Justice, Robert Kaplan, opposed the motion
before the Special Joint Committee arguing that to enshrine a right
to information in the Constitution would amount to a "very serious
abandonment by Parliament of a responsibility to deal with the question
of access to information."" In short, he argued that the government
recognized that there should be a right to information and that it was
moving to protect that right through its proposed access to information
legislation. 45 The acting Minister of Justice also argued that to entrench the
right to information in the Constitution would be unwieldy in the absence
of existing access legislation as it would effectively require the courts to
deal with access requests on an ad hoc basis until it had constructed an
access regime based on its jurisprudence. 46
42. Ibid. at paras. 126-129 and ff. However, the Chief Justice noted that the level of independence
extended by provincial court judges may not be the same as that enjoyed by superior court judges.
43. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the
House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, No. 43(22 January, 1981) at 101 (Hon. Robert
Kaplan) [Minutes of the Special Joint Committee].
44. Ibid. at 105.
45. The federal Access Act had not yet been passed into law at this time, although it had been
drafted.
46. Minutes of the Special Joint Committee, supra note 43.
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The acting Justice Minister's arguments were rejected by opposition
members of the Special Joint Committee who noted that entrenching the
right to information in the Charter would not prevent the government from
enacting its proposed access legislation, rather it would constitutionally
mandate such legislation and provide assurance that the legislation could
not be arbitrarily removed by future governments.47 Nonetheless, the
motion to include a right to information in the Charter was defeated by a
vote of 14 to 10 in the Special Joint Committee.
48
The rejection of the proposed motion is not surprising given the
government's opposition to the motion and its dominance of the membership
of the committee. However, it is worth noting that the government's
opposition to the inclusion of a right to access government information in
the Constitution was not absolute. Rather, the acting Minister of Justice
insisted that the government believed that it was important to establish a
legislative framework for access prior to entrenching a constitutional right
of access: Acting Minister Kaplan even contemplated that at some point
the. Canadian Constitution should include protection of a right to access
government information. He stated:
I want in closing to concede that at some point in our history when this
is legislated, when some other piece of legislation is legislated, it might
very well be down the road in the development of our constitution, once
the basic concept of freedom of information is developed, as they are in
the process of being developed now, to talk about entrenchment...49
In this way, the decision not to include protection of a right to access
government information in the Charter may be distinguished from the
decision to exclude property rights. The latter decision was a principled
decision to exclude a particular type of right from constitutional protection.
By contrast, the decision not to include protection of access to information
was not based on a principled rejection of constitutional protection of such
a right. Rather, it was based on considerations of ripeness, particularly
the argument that a statutory framework should be established prior to
entrenching a right to access.
It is in keeping with the acting Minister of Justice's comments to
note that even by the time the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
was constitutionally entrenched in 1982, the importance of access to
government information in the democratic process was only beginning to
47. Ibid. at 109-110 (James McGrath); 110-112 (Perrin Beatty); 112-114 (Fraser); 114-116 (Svend
Robinson).
48. Ibid. at 116.
49. Ibid. at 106.
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be fully appreciated. Certainly there had been little legislative experience
with a general right to access government information in Canada prior to
that time. However, in the quarter century since the entrenchment of the
Charter, both the recognition of the importance of access to government
information and the implementation of legislative access regimes has
blossomed in Canada and internationally.
It is also important to recall that the Supreme Court has specifically
recognized that the need for the Charter to evolve over time in order to
address changing circumstances is an important reason not to place too
much weight on the statements made by those involVed in the drafting of
the Charter Thus, in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act Reference, then Justice
Lamer noted the near impossibility of ascertaining the intention of the
legislative bodies that adopted the Charter.5 0 He went on to warn against
giving too much weight to the records of the discussions in the Joint
Committee, writing:
Another danger with casting the interpretation of s. 7 in terms of
the comments made by those heard at the Special Joint Committee
Proceedings is that, in so doing, the rights, freedoms and values
embodied in the Charter in effect become frozen in time to the moment
of adoption with little or no possibility of growth, development and
adjustment to changing societal needs. Obviously, in the present case,
given the proximity in time of the Charter debates, such a problem is
relatively minor, even though it must be noted that even at this early
stage in the life of the Charter, a host of issues and questions have been
raised which were largely unforeseen at the time of such proceedings.
If the newly planted "living tree" which is the Charter is to have the
possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to
ensure that historical materials, such as the Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence of the Special Joint Committee, do not stunt its growth."
In light of the growing recognition ofthe importance of access to information
to the democratic process, it is arguable that the time has come to extend
the reach of the Constitution to protect access. The recognition of such a
right would fill a gap that has developed over time as.our democracy has
matured and the expectations of citizens to be involved in the process of
50. Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Cohmbia) s. 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at para. 52.
Justice Lamer stated:
Were this Court to accord any significant weight to this testimony, it would in effect be
assuming a fact which is nearly impossible of proof, i.e., the intention of the legislative
bodies which adopted the Charter. In view of the indeterminate nature of the data, it would
in my view be erroneous to give these materials anything but minimal weight.
51. Ibid. at para. 53.
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governance, through mechanisms of participation and accountability, have
outstripped the existing constitutional protections for those mechanisms.
The fundamental change in the democratic process that has occurred
over the last twenty-five years, which has culminated in the near universal
recognition of the vital role of access to government information in
ensuring effective democratic governance, thus provides an imtus to
look beyond a strict interpretation of the written terms of the Const. -ition
that are designed to protect the democratic process, particularly sections
2(b) and 3 of the Charter. Such a search naturally involves a consideration
of the principle of democracy that underlies and informs the written
provisions of the Constitution and that holds those provisions together in
a comprehensive and coherent whole.
IV. Why shouldjudges fill the access gap in the Constitution instead of
legislatures?
Even after an access gap in the Constitution has been identified, the question
remains: why should the judiciary fill the gap instead of the legislature?
That question may seem particularly prescient in the case of access to
government information in light of the fact that a motion to include the
right in the Constitution was rejected by the Special Joint Committee in
1981.
At this stage it seems appropriate to distinguish between three different
ways in which gaps may develop in the Constitution. A gap may develop in
the first instance because the framers of the Constitution failed to foresee
the development of circumstances that would necessitate constitutional
protection of a right. In the second instance, a gap may develop because
the constitutional framers recognized a potential threat but did not
consider it necessary to implement explicit constitutional protection at
the time. In both instances, a gap may develop over time because society
and its governing processes have evolved beyond the ambit of the written
provisions of the Constitution and the legislature has failed to update the
written provisions of the Constitution.
In the third instance a gap may appear to exist because there is no
express protection of a particular right, however the absence of protection
is a result of a principled decision of the framers to exclude protection
of a particular type of right. The best example of this is the decision not
to protect property rights in the Charter discussed above. Application of
unwritten constitutional principles to fill gaps in the constitutional text may
be more easily justified in the first and second instances than in the third
instance. Indeed, where a principled decision has been made to exclude
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protection of a particular type of right in the Constitution it will be difficult
to characterize the absence of protection as a gap at all.52
Despite the fact that the Special Joint Committee rejected a motion
to include a right to access government information in the Charter, the
protection of such a right was not rejected in principle, but rather, as noted
in the statements of the acting Minister of Justice, was rejected as a practical
matter. The government's stated position in 1981 was that a legislative
regime should be put in place prior to entrenching a constitutional right
to access. By contrast, the opposition to inclusion of a right to protection
of private property was a principled objection. The access gap thus falls
in the second category of constitutional gaps; it may be more difficult
to justify the application of unwritten constitutional principles to fill the
gap because the right was considered for inclusion in the text during the
constitutional drafting process. However, justification of the application of
the principle of democracy in this case is less difficult than it would be had
the exclusion of an explicit right to access to government information been
the result of a principled objection to its inclusion in the Charter.
What, then, is the argument that supports judicial application of the
principle of democracy to fill the access gap in the Canadian Constitution?
Another way to frame this question may be to ask: why not rely on our
elected representatives to remedy any problems with access to government
information? Interestingly, the argument that remedies for failures to protect
access to government information should be left to the political process is
one of the arguments used to reject recognition of a constitutional right to
access in the cases identified at the beginning of this section. For example,
Justice Adams, who delivered the unanimous decision of the Ontario
Divisional Court (Justices Hartt and Then, concurring) in the Fineberg
case, rejected Fineberg's argument "that a democratic government must
be accountable to the people and information concerning its performance
is essential to such accountability."53 Rather, Justice Adams held that the
system of political accountability provided the necessary accountability
of the bureaucracy and government. In his view, elected officials hold
the bureaucracy accountable and are, in turn, held accountable through
elections. In 'addition, the opposition parties hold the government
accountable by asking critical questions in the legislature and committees.
He concluded that: "Against this tradition, it is not possible to proclaim
52. However, in light of the Court's suspicion of the statements of legislators and government
officials such an exclusion may not be absolutely determinative.
53. Fineberg, supra note 12 at para. 16.
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that s. 2(b) entails a general constitutional right of access to all information
under the control of government ...- 4
The main weakness of the approach adopted by Justice Adams is that it
fails to explain how either the opposition or the electorate could effectively
hold the government to account if they were insufficiently informed of what
the government was actually doing. In other words, it may be impossible
to rely on citizens to hold governments accountable through the political
process where those citizens are denied access to sufficient information to
consider and weigh the actions of government. This becdmes particularly
problematic where government itself is responsible for restricting access
to the necessary information.
The primary argument in favour of judicial involvement in protecting
a right to access government information is directly connected to the
importance of access within the democratic process. One of the fundamental
roles of the judiciary is to ensure the protection of our constitutionally
mandated democratic process of governance.55 The judiciary is tasked
with enforcing constitutional limits on the exercise of legislative power.
Nowhere can that role be more vital than where the legislature may seek
to exercise its power to hinder the democratic process. Given the vital role
that access to government information plays in ensuring the effectiveness,
of our democratic process, judges must be willing to prevent legislatures
from unjustifiably limiting access to government information.
This recognition that courts must act to counterbalance illegitimate
exercises of government power is at the heart of Choudhry and Howse's
dualist theory of constitutional interpretation.5 6 According to Choudhry
and Howse, the courts may engage in extra-ordinary interpretation and
legitimately apply unwritten constitutional principles as more than just
interpretive aids in cases where the very legitimacy of the constitutional
order is threatened. In their view, in such situations, it may not be practical
to wait for the legislature to fill the constitutional gaps at issue. I would go
further to argue that it may not be realistic to expect the legislature to fill
54. Ibid. at para. 19.
55. Reference re Language Rights under the Manitoba Act, 1870, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 19 D.L.R.
(4 1) I [Manitoba Language Rights Reference cited to S.C.R.] at 745.
56. Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, "Constitutional Theory and The Quebec Secession Reference"
(2000) 13 Can. J.L. &Jur. 143 at 156ff.
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gaps in the text of the Constitution in cases where the government itself
seeks to take advantage of the gap to undermine the democratic process."
In this way, if we extend Choudhry and Howse's conception of extra-
ordinary interpretation to focus on threats to the democratic process, as
opposed to merely situational threats to the legitimacy of the constitutional
order, we recognize that judges have an important role in filling gaps in the
Constitution. This judicial role does not supplant the legislative role, but
rather supplements it, particularly in cases where it is either not practical
or not realistic to rely on the legislature to fill a gap in the text of the
Constitution.
The absence of explicit protection of access to government information
in the text of the Canadian Constitution is a gap in protection of the
democratic process provided by the Constitution. As in the case of the
Provincial Judges Reference, this gap has arisen because the development
of the Canadian state and the process for governing it have outstripped the
explicit scope of the written provisions of the Constitution. In particular,
the growing expectations of access to government information in order to
facilitate participation in the political process and to assist in maintaining
accountability of government have outstripped the basic protections
offered by sections 2(b) and 3 of the Charter (as they have been interpreted
to date).
While the reluctance of government MPs to include explicit
protection to access to government information in the Charter in 1981
must be acknowledged, that reluctance was based on an assumption that
constitutional protection of such a right was desirable, but not yet timely.
Twenty five years later, it may be said that the time for constitutional
protection of access to government information has arrived. More
importantly, in light of the possibility that government itself may benefit
from preventing such constitutional protection, the judiciary has a
legitimate and necessary (some may say extraordinary) role in filling the
access gap in the Constitution through the application of the principle of
democracy.
57. This type of 'representation-reinforcing', process-oriented, approach to constitutional
interpretation has been advanced by a number of scholars in the context of American constitutional
interpretation, most notably John Hart Ely in his book Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). Although the application of Ely's
approach provides one possible framework for understanding the role of courts in constitutional
interpretation, its application in the Canadian context requires some adjustment for the British heritage
of unwritten constitutionalism that informs the Canadian Constitution. A fuller discussion of this
approach, though important, is beyond the scope of this article.
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V. How can the principle of democracy help to fill the access gap in the
Constitution?
The Supreme Court's most important discussion of the general role of
unwritten constitutional principles may be found in the Quebec Secession
Reference. In that case, the Court noted that the principle of democracy is
best understood as a baseline against which the Constitution has always
operated. The baseline, which includes the representative and democratic
nature of Canada's political institutions, was not explicitly mentioned in
the text of the Constitution Act, 1867 because it was simply assumed to
operate. Over time, the democratic baseline has been raised as Canada's
"governing institutions have adapted and changed to reflect changing
social and political values."58 This evolution of Canadian democratic
institutions, which has largely been the result of legislative action, has
resulted in greater and more effective representation and, ultimately, the
realization of universal adult suffrage.
Notably, the Court's discussion in the Quebec Secession Reference did
not limit the democratic principle to procedural goals, but also recognized
that democracy includes substantive goals, most importantly the promotion
of self-government. 9 This substantive goal of self-government is achieved
through rigorous protection of the democratic process. As such, the Court
reaffirmed that the democratic process itself requires a continuous process
of discussion to be effective. It also recognized that the democratic
process must facilitate two aspects of political participation: participation
in policy-making and the ability to hold accountable those who govern.
In the Court's words, the legitimacy of our democratic institutions rests
on their ability to "allow for the participation of, and accountability to,
the people... ".60 Ultimately, the Court recognized, our democratic system
"must be capable of reflecting the aspirations of the people."'6'
In short, the Supreme Court's discussion of the principle of democracy
in the Quebec Secession Reference recognized the importance of protecting
the democratic process in order to attain the substantive goal of self-
governance. The results of the democratic process must ultimately reflect
the aspirations of the people. At a minimum, within a democratic system,
those aspirations include the ability to participate in the political system
and to hold that system accountable. Access to government information
58. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 16 at para. 33.
59. Other substantive goals include the respect for the rule of law and moral values that are embedded
in the Canadian constitutional structure. The Court thus emphasized that the democratic principle
should not be limited to the notion of majority rule.
60. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 16 at para. 67.
61. Ibid.
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facilitates, and in many cases ensures, meaningful participation within the
political process, both in terms of participation in the process of policy
development and in terms of holding government officials accountable.
Protecting access to government information thus matches the fundamental
objective of the principle of democracy-protecting those elements of
the political process that are necessary to achieve self-governance. In the
sections that follow, I wilt consider more specifically how the principle of
democracy provides the foundation for constitutional protection of access
to government information through the application of sections 2(b) and 3
of the Charter6
2
Section 2(b) of the Charter
Much of the Supreme Court's discussion of the need to protect the
democratic process has been triggered by cases concerning section 2(b)
of the Charter There are two important trends in the Supreme Court's s.
2(b) jurisprudence that merit our attention. First, the Court has repeatedly
recognized that freedom of political speech was constitutionally protected
prior to the entrenchment of the Charter and that the foundation of its
constitutional protection is the role it plays in protecting the democratic
process. 63 Second, in post-Charter cases, justices of the Supreme Court
62. A number of academics have traced and analyzed the Supreme Court's "electoral jurisprudence".
For the most part, these academics have focused their attention on identifying and critiquing how the
Court's jurisprudence reflects or reinforces an egalitarian rather than libertarian approach to protecting
democratic rights. See, for example: Colin Feasby, "Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the Administration
of the Process of Democracy Under the Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian Model" (1999) 44 McGill
L.J. 5; Heather Maclvor, "Judicial Review and Electoral Democracy: The Contested Status of Political
Parties Under the Charter" (2002) Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 479; Andrew Geddis, "Libert6, Egalit6,
Argent: Third Party Election Spending and the Charter" (2004) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 429; Christopher D.
Bredt, and Markus F. Kremer, "Section 3 of the Charter: Democratic Rights at the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2005) Nat'l J. Const. L. 19; Christopher Manfredi and Mark Rush, "Electoral Jurisprudence
in the Canadian and U.S. Supreme Courts: Evolution and Convergence" (2007) McGill L.J. 457.
63. For example, in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at 1336,
Justice Cory wrote:
It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democratic society than
freedom of expression. Indeed a democracy cannot exist without that freedom to express
new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions. The
concept of free and uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic societies and
institutions. The vital importance of the concept cannot be over-emphasized.
Similarly, in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 763, Chief Justice Dickson recognized the
important link between freedom of expression and the political process and the importance of freedom
of expression in facilitating participation in the political process. He stated:
The connection between freedom of expression and the political process is perhaps the
linchpin of the s. 2(b) guarantee, and the nature of this connection is largely derived from
the Canadian commitment to democracy. Freedom of expression is a crucial aspect of the
democratic commitment, not merely because it permits the best policies to be chosen from
among a wide array of proffered options, but additionally because it helps to ensure that
participation in the political process is open to all persons.
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have emphasized that the role of freedom of expression in protecting the
democratic process extends beyond simply promoting open debate to
ensuring that voters have sufficient information to ensure that their votes
accurately reflect their preferences.
The Supreme Court of Canada has considered the specific ways in
which freedom of expression supports the political process in a number
of cases. In two early cases, Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)'
and Libman v. Quebec,65 the Court considered claims of limitations on
expression in the context of referenda. These early cases established
the foundation for the Court's later decisions dealing with restrictions
on expression in the context of elections. Notably, in Libman, the Court
upheld restrictions on freedom of expression because those restrictions
promoted voter equality by preventing the most affluent members of
society from dominating debate during a referendum. In this way, the
restrictions would help to ensure that voters were adequately informed
prior to voting. The Court stated:
Spending limits are also necessary to guarantee the right of electors to
be adequately informed of all the political positions advanced by the
candidates and by the various political parties. Thus, the principle of
64. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, 105 D.L.R. (4 th) 577 [Haig, cited to D.L.R.]. The Haig case emerged out
of the referendum held in relation to the proposals to amend the Canadian Constitution contained in
the Charlottetown Accord. The referendum was held pursuant to federal law across Canada, except in
Quebec where the referendum was held pursuant to provincial law. The claimant Haig was a resident
of Ontario who had recently moved to Quebec. As a result of differences in the residency requirements
under the federal legislation and the Quebec legislation, Haig was denied the right to vote in either
referendum. He challenged the federal Referendum Act, S.C. 1992, c. 30, claiming that, by excluding
him from voting in the federaf referendum, it violated his rights under sections 2(b), 3 and 15 of the
Charter
Justice L'Heureux-Dubd wrote the majority judgment. She found that the Order in Council
requiring that a federal referendum be held in some, but not all provinces, was constitutionally valid.
She concluded that section 3 of the Charter did not include a constitutional right to vote in a referendum.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 also found that there was no violation of section 2(b) of the Charter since
the freedom of expression did not guarantee the provision of a specific means of expression, such as
voting in a referendum. I will deal with the s. 3 aspect of her decision in the next section of the article.
Justice L'Heureux-Dubd also rejected the claim based on section 15, but I will not address that part of
her reasons in this article.
65. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, 151 D.L.R. (4 ) 385 [Libman, cited to D.L.R.]. Libman concerned a
challenge to certain provisions of Appendix 2 of Quebec's Referendum Act, R.S.Q., c. C-64.1. The
complainant Robert Libman, the president of the Equality Party, claimed that the provisions, which
required that certain types of regulated expenses, including advertising expenses, must be paid out of
the funds of committees authorized to represent particular sides in a referendum in Quebec, violated
sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter. In effect the provisions required individuals to associate with
one of two national committees on either side of a referendum question in order to incur regulated
expenses during the course of the referendum campaign. If the individual wished to pursue a campaign
independent of the two committees, then she could not incur any regulated expenses. The Court
concluded that the provisions infringed s. 2(b) and s. 2(d) of the Charter, and that the infringement
could not be justified under s. 1.
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fairness presupposes that certain rights or freedoms can legitimately
be restricted in the name of a healthy electoral democracy (Lortie
Commission, supra, at p. 323). Elections are fair and equitable only if
all citizens are reasonably informed of all the possible choices and if
parties and candidates are given a reasonable opportunity to present their
positions so that election discourse is not dominated by those with access
to greater financial resources. (Lortie Commission, supra, at p. 324).66
This notion of the right to an informed vote, be it in an election or a
referendum, recurs in the cases dealing with both s. 2(b) and s. 3 of the
Charter that will be discussed below.
67
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)
The important role of s. 2(b) in protecting access to information necessary to
promote 'informed' voting was again underlined in Thomson Newspapers
Co. v. Canada (Attorney General).6" Thomson Newspapers involved a
challenge to s. 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act,69 which banned the
broadcasting, publication or dissemination of opinion polls during the
final 72 hours of an election campaign.
Both the majority and dissenting judgments in the case agreed that
it was vital to protect access to political information, in this case polling
results, in order to ensure that voters could make informed choices on
election day. However, the majority and dissent disagreed on the central
issue of whether the ban on polling results enhanced or restricted access
to this type of political information. Justice Bastarache, writing for the
majority, found that the provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and that
the violation could not be. saved under s. 1.7o His section 1 analysis focused
66. Ibid. at 410.
67. In Libman, the Court found that some limitations on expression could be justified in order to
ensure fair votes in referenda or elections. However, the Court concluded that the spending restrictions
on third parties, which amounted to an almost complete ban, were not minimally impairing of the right
to expression and association. The Court found that allowing individuals and groups who could neither
join nor affiliate themselves with the national committees a minimum amount of money that they
could spend to communicate their positions would have provided a less intrusive means of achieving
the legislation's stated objective. It struck down the impugned provisions.
68. [19981 S.C.R. 877,(1998), 159 D.L.R. (4") 385 [Thomson Newspapers, cited to D.L.R.].
69. R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2.
70. It is worth noting that Justice Bastarache found that it was unnecessary to determine whether the
provision violated s. 3 of the Charter. Nonetheless, Justice Bastarache opined that "to constituie an
infringement of the right to vote, a restriction on information would have to undermine.the guarantee
of effective representation." Thomson Newspapers, supra note 68 at 427. Justice Gonthier, writing
in dissent, found that the ban did not violate s. 3 of the Charter. He explicitly agreed with Justice
Bastarache that section 3 could only be violated by a restriction on information if it undermined the
guarantee of effective representation. He concluded that the provisions in issue did not have such
an effect, but rather assisted effective representation by allowing voters enough time to scrutinize
and discuss published poll results before election day. As such, he found no violation of s. 3 of the
Charter.
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on the damage inflicted to the flow of political information in the electoral
process by banning access to polling results. For example, when weighing
the detrimental effects of the ban, Justice Bastarache stated:
The impact on freedom of expression in this case is profound. This is a
complete ban on political information at a crucial time in the electoral
process: The ban interferes with the rights of voters who want access to
the most timely polling information available, and with the rights of the
media and pollsters who want to provide it. It is an interference with the
flow of information pertaining to the most important democratic duty
which most Canadians will undertake in their lives: their choice as to
who will govern them.. 1
In his dissenting reasons, Justice Gonthier agreed with Justice Bastarache
that the ban on the publication of opinion polls in the last 72 hours of an
election campaign infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter. However, contrary to
Justice Bastarache, Justice Gonthier found that the ban protected voters
from receiving false information by ensuring there was enough time to
refute inaccurate polls released close to the election day.72 Justice Gonthier
concluded that the ban on the publication of polling results thus enhanced
the purpose of the freedom of expression itself, including "the ability
of voters to make informed choices and the promotion of political and
social participation..." 73 Justice Gonthier found that there were no equally
effective alternatives to the ban and that the limited effect of the 72-hour
ban was outweighed by the positive impact of ensuring that voters are
properly informed when voting. He concluded that the infringement of s.
2(b) could be justified under s. 1.
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)
The notion that the freedom of expression includes a right to receive
certain information was also a key to the decision in Harper v. Canada
(Attorney General).74 The Harper case involved a challenge to spending
limits included in the Canada Elections Act, 75 which limited the spending
of individuals and groups on advertising during an election. The challenge
71. Ibid. at 454.
72. Ibid. at 403-404. Justice Gonthier stated:
The quest for better information gives more meaning to voter participation in the electoral
process. The very fact that some voters base their decision on opinion survey polls may
justify the means taken to promote voters' right to good information. This is consistent with
the findings of this Court that one of the objectives underlying freedom of expression is
the ability of voters to make informed choices (Libman, supra, at para 54; Ford v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at p. 767, 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577).
73. Ibid. at 410.
74. (2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, 239 D.L.R. (41h) 192 [Harper, cited to D.L.R.].
75. S.C. 2000, c. 9.
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was launched by Stephen Harper, then the head of the National Citizens
Coalition, now the Prime Minister of Canada. He argued that the provisions,
which restricted individuals and groups, not including political parties,
from spending more than $3,000 in any individual electoral district and
$150,000 nationally on advertising during an election, violated sections
2(b), 2(d) and 3 of the Charter.
All of the judges who heard the appeal agreed that the impugned
provisions did not infringe the right to vote. The judges also agreed that the
impugned provisions infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter The majority found
that the infringement could be justified under s. 1, while the dissenting
judges found that the infringement created by two of the provisions could
not be justified under s. 1.76 Once again, the division between majority and
dissentingjudges revolved around the best way to ensure access to sufficient
information to protect the ability of citizens to make informed choices
when voting. Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority, emphasized an
'egalitarian model' of the electoral process that "requires the wealthy to be
prevented from controlling the electoral process to the detriment of others
with less economic power. '7 7 This egalitarian model ultimately justified
the infringement of s. 2(b) created by the limits on third party spending
because the limits created a 'level playing field' for those wishing to enter
the electoral debate and thereby ensured access to better information. In
Justice Bastarache's words, the spending limit "enables voters to be better
informed; no one voice is overwhelmed by another.
7 8
The dissenting judges, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major,
shared Justice Bastarache's concern with ensuring that voters have
sufficient information to make informed choices. They reiterated the
Court's position that the right to participate in political discourse included a
right to effective participation, which required, in turn, access to sufficient
76. At present, I will focus on the discussion of the freedom of expression in the dissenting reasons.
I will examine the discussion of s. 3 of the Charter in the majority reasons in the next section.
77. Harper supra note 74 at 226.
78. Ibid. at 226-227.
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information.79 Indeed, they held that the freedom of expression includes a
right to receive the information necessary to exercise an informed vote.
Freedom of expression protects not only the individual who speaks the
message, but also the recipient. Members of the public - as viewers,
listeners and readers - have a right to information on public governance,
absent which they cannot cast an informed vote; see Edmonton Journal,
supra, at pp. 1339-40. 8o
According to the Chief Justice and Justice Major, the Canada Elections
Act undermined the right to listen by withholding from voters the
substantive analysis and commentary on political issues that is critical to
their individual and collective deliberation." The dissent concluded that
the violation of freedom of expression could not be justified under s. 1 of
the Charter.
All of the judgments in both Harper and Thomson recognized that
one of the primary purposes of s. 2(b) of the Charter is to protect the right
to an informed vote, which includes the right to receive the information
necessary to make the right to vote meaningful. While thejudgments in these
cases focused on the right to receive information concerning the political
opinions or political analysis of non-state actors, it is not difficult to apply
the same logic to support an argument in favour of access to information
concerning what the government is doing. Indeed, in the quest to promote
informed voting, information concerning what the government is doing is
at least as necessary as access to the opinions of others concerning political
issues. Government information is often the raw material upon which such
opinions may be formed. If so, how can access to opinions be protected if
access to information is not?
In summary, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that
a fundamental requirement of Canadian democracy is that voter
preferences are accurately reflected in the ballots cast to select legislative
representatives. While the judges of the Supreme Court have been divided
79. Ibid. at 205. The Chief Justice and Justice Major stated:
The right to participate in political discourse is a right to effective participation - for
each citizen to play a "meaningful' role in the nocratic process, to borrow again from
the language of Figueroa, supra. In C.-1- or ' . Commonwealth, supra, at p. 250,
McLachlin J. stated that s. 2(b) aspi. the interest of the individual in effectively
communicating his or her mess.; - to members of the public" (emphasis added). In the same
case, Lamer C.J. declared that "it must be understood that the individual has an interest in
communicating his ideas in a place which, because of the presence of listeners, will favour
the effective dissemination of what he has to say" (emphasis added); see Committee for the
Commonwealth, supra, at p. 154.
80. Ibid. at 206.
81. Ibid.
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about the best mechanisms for ensuring access to the information necessary
to promote informed voting, the Court has been united in its recognition of
the importance of access to information to ensure meaningful participation
in the electoral process. Even in those cases where members of the Court
have been willing to accept limits on expression they have done so to
protect the quality of information available to voters, in furtherance of the
ultimate goal of protecting access to that information necessary to ensure
that voters can make informed choices.
The existing jurisprudence thus provides a strong foundation for
the extension of Charter protection of freedom of expression to include
protection of access to government information. Democracies cannot
function unless voters are allowed to discuss, debate, and criticize
political issues, policies and government behaviour. However, the right
to expression may be rendered meaningless without access to information
concerning what the government is actually doing. Our right to talk is an
empty one unless we have something to talk about.
There remains one important doctrinal obstacle to the protection of
access to government information through section 2(b) of the Charter.
This obstacle is the Supreme Court's finding that s. 2(b) should not be
interpreted to impose positive obligations on government except in
exceptional circumstances. Thus, for instance, in Haig, Justice L'Heureux-
Dubd concluded that there was no positive obligation on government to
ensure that citizens could express their views in any given referendum.12 As
a result, the exclusion of a particular citizen's right to vote in a consultative
process such as a referendum was not a violation of the freedom of
expression. She reached this conclusion based on the fact that it had not
yet been determined that s. 2(b) of the Charter obliged the government to
provide "a particular platform to facilitate the freedom of expression."83
82. Haig, supra note 64 at 603. Her finding that that the freedom of expression did not include a right
to vote in a referendum was based on her view that the Charter's fundamental freedoms, such as the
right to freedom of expression protected by section 2(b) of the Charter, are traditionally conceived as
involving only a negative obligation not to restrict the right in question.
83. Ibid. at 604.
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This interpretive rule was relied upon by Justice Blair in the Ontario
Divisional Court's decision in the Criminal Lawyers 'Association case. 4 As
noted earlier, the Criminal Lawyers Association case concerned the attempts
by the CLA to obtain access to documents related to an investigation by
the Ontario Provincial Police. The investigation concerned the behaviour
of police officers and Crown officials in a high-profile murder case in
the 1990s. In an attempt to get more information concerning the OPP
investigation, the CLA requested disclosure of documents related to the
investigation and its report, pursuant to FOIPPA.85 As part of its challenge
against the refusal of the government to disclose documents relevant to
its request, the CLA argued that section 2(b) protects a right to access
government information.
Relying on Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's findings in Haig, Justice Blair
held that section 2(b) should not be interpreted in a way that imposes
a positive obligation on government to provide access to government
information. The general rule, he noted, is that there is no positive obligation
on government to facilitate expressive activity or to make expression more
effective. Justice Blair found that the CLA was not barred from expressing
its opinions in the Criminal Lawyers Association case, but rather that the
effectiveness of its expression was hindered by the failure to disclose the
requested documents.86
84. Justice Blair's decision was overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal: Ontario Criminal
Lawyers Association v. Ontario (Public Safety and Security), 2007 ONCA 392, 280 D.L.R. (4')
193, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 382. Unfortunately, Justice LaForme's
majority reasons in the Court of Appeal decision failed to adequately address the major objections to
the recognition of a constitutional right to access government information. Notably, the dissenting
reasons of Justice Juriansz repeat many of the points raised by Justice Blair at the Divisional Court.
Justice Juriansz gives particular weight to the decision of the Special Joint Committee to reject an
entrenched right to access government information and to the prevailing attitude that section 2(b)
should not be interpreted to impose positive obligations except in the rarest of circumstances. (Paras.
107-119, 125-138).
85. The Ministry of the Solicitor General -now the Ministry of Public Safety and Security -found
three documents relevant to the CLA's request for information: a 318 page police report, a 12 March
1998 memorandum and a 24 March 1998 letter related to the investigation. However, the Ministry
refused to disclose any of the documents. The Ministry justified its refusal to disclose the 318 page
report by arguing that the report was a "law enforcement record" and thus subject to its discretion to
refuse disclosure pursuant to section 14 of FOIPPA. It further argued that the memo and letter were
protected by solicitor-client privilege and thus subject to its discretion to refuse disclosure pursuant
to s. 19 of FOIPPA. The CLA appealed the decision of the Ministry to the Assistant Commissioner
of the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. The Assistant Commissioner
upheld the decision of the Ministry, finding that the documents fell under the discretionary exemptions
to disclosure in sections 14, 19, and 21 of the Act, respectively. He further determined that, despite the
fact that there existed a "compelling public interest" in the disclosure of the documents, the documents
could not be disclosed because sections 14 and 19 of the Act are not subject to the public interest
override otherwise available under section 23 of the Act.
86. Ibid. at para. 65.
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In my view, Justice Blair's analysis confused effectiveness with
meaningfulness. Admittedly, the Supreme Court of Canada has doubted
whether s. 2(b) imposes an obligation on governments to enhance the
effectiveness of expression through, for instance, distributing megaphones.
Recall that in Haig, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 framed this argument,
writing: "The traditional view, in colloquial terms, is that the freedom of
expression contained in s. 2(b) prohibits gags, but does not compel the
distribution of megaphones." 7
It is useful to pause here to unpack the metaphor used by Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6. The distribution of megaphones mentioned by Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 would improve the effectiveness of communication by
ensuring that any communication would be heard by more people because
of the augmented volume provided by the megaphone. Alternatively, the
distribution of megaphones would facilitate expression by making it easier
to communicate with a given number of people by eliminating the need for
the speaker to shout, for example.
The Court's finding that governments do not have an obligation to
either facilitate, or magnify the volume of, expression must be contrasted
with its recognition that, in some circumstances, governments may be
under a positive obligation to ensure the meaningfulness of expression.
This potential obligation was also recognized by Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
in Haig, where she stated:
Under this approach, a situation might arise in which, in order to make
a fundamental freedom meaningful, a posture of restraint would not be
enough, and positive governmental action might be required. This might,
for example, take the form of legislative intervention aimed at preventing
c~rtain conditions which muzzle expression, or ensuring access to certain
kinds of information.88
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 thus explicitly recognized that access to certain
kinds of information may be necessary to support the meaningfulness of
expression as opposed to facilitating expression or increasing its volume.
In the Criminal Lawyers Association case, the applicants sought access to
the records in issue in order to render their expression meaningful, not in
order to facilitate that expression or to magnify its volume. In other words,
87. Haig, supra note 64 at 604 [emphasis in original].
88. Ibid. at 607 [emphasis added].
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without the information they sought, the CLA could not meaningfully
comment on the report issued by the police.89
In my.view, Justice Blair erred in finding that the plaintiffs' claim that
s. 2(b) included a right to the information sought in the Criminal Lawyers
Association case should be dismissed because it amounted to an attempt
to impose an obligation on the government to increase the effectiveness
of their expression.9" Justice Blair's s. 2(b) analysis was flawed in
so far as it portrayed access to government information as a means of
rendering expression more effective rather than as a means of rendering it
meaningfpl.
Blinkered by the formal requirements of s. 2(b) analysis and
convinced that s. 2(b) should not result in positive obligations being
placed on the government, Justice Blair's analysis was unable to make
the link between expression and access to government information despite
the fact that he repeatedly recognized the important role of access to
government information in the democratic process. 91 This failure of Justice
Blair's analytical approach serves as an important lesson. Engaging the
fundamental principle of democracy in the process of interpreting s. 2(b)
requires an acknowledgement of the foundational role of freedom of
expression in ensuring meaningful participation in the democratic process.
Such an acknowledgement should render it much more difficult to ignore
the link between access to information and freedom of expression.
Ultimately, the importance of access to government information to the
democratic process is such that it fits within the category of "exceptional
circumstances" that allow for the imposition of positive obligations on
89. Interestingly, in his reasons, Justice Blair, like Justice L'Heureux-Dub , also allowed for the
possibility that, in some cases, a positive obligation may arise. Justice Blair opined that such a positive
obligation would only arise where there was a complete suppression of expression. Criminal Lawyers
Association (Div. Ct), supra note 15 at para. 61.
90. Nonetheless, Justice Blair may have been correct in concluding that a potential violation of
s. 2(b) of the Charter could be justified under section 1. The exclusion of access to information in
criminal investigations may be justified in certain circumstances in a free and democratic society.
However, it is worth noting that the information sought in the Criminal Lawyers Association case did
not pertain to an ongoing criminal investigation and thus the arguments for restricting its disclosure
are less convincing.
91. Interestingly, in considering the section 1 analysis, Justice Blair specifically noted the importance
of access to information to the democratic process. Criminal Lmvyers Association (Div Ct), supra note
15 at para. 24. Justice Blair stated:
There can be little debate, in my view, that the objectives of the Legislature in enacting
the scheme to ensure that government information is more readily accessible to the public,
subject to limited and specific necessary exceptions as set out in the Act "relate to concerns
that are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society". Greater accessibility
to such information - promoting as it does, greater transparency and accountability in
government - is responsive to important principles underlying our democratic society, as
the authorities referred to us by the Applicant demonstrate. [emphasis added].
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the government through s. 2 of the Charter One approach by which such
an exceptional circumstance may be identified was set out by Justice
Rothstein in his majority decision in Baier v. Alberta.92 In particular,
Justice Rothstein noted that where a positive entitlement is claimed under
s. 2(b), the claimant must establish three factors:
(1) that the claim is grounded in a fundamental freedom of expression
rather than in access to a particular statutory regime; (2) that the claimant
has demonstrated that exclusion from a statutory regime has the effect of
a substantial interference with s. 2(b) freedom of expression, or has the
purpose of infringing freedom of expression under s. 2(b); and (3) that the
government is responsible for the inability to exercise the fundamental
freedom... 93
In my view, access to government information plays such an important role
in ensuring that citizens can make informed choices when voting and more
generally participating in the political process that it must be considered
to lie at the core of s. 2(b)'s mission to protect meaningful political
participation. As such, claims for protection of access to government
information transcend mere claims of access to the statutory platforms for
access. Finally, government-imposed limitations on access that constrain
meaningful participation in the political process represent substantial
interferences with the core mission of s. 2(b). In light of this, imposition of
a positive obligation to provide access to government information through
s. 2(b) of the Charter is readily justified.94
Section 3 of the Charter
While a strong argument may be advanced for protection of access to
government information through section 2(b), an even stronger argument
may be made for protection of access through the right to vote protected by
s. 3 of the Charter The right to vote stands at the heart of the democratic
process. Without it, there can be no claim to democratic legitimacy. In
Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada has developed a highly substantive
conception of the right to vote that is based on the importance of meaningful
participation of citizens in the democratic process.
92. 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673. 1 am not convinced that this approach is entirely coherent
or viable, however, for the purpose of this article, it suffices to apply the approach without critical
analysis.
93. Ibid. at para. 30.
94. I note that it is also arguable that restrictions on access to government information are limitations
on access to information that belongs to the people, and as such access may be characterized as a
negative liberty. However, I will not explore this argument in detail in this article.
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The Supreme Court's existing jurisprudence supports the application
of section 3 to protect a right to access government information in three
ways. First, the Court's jurisprudence reinforces an approach to the
interpretation of democratic rights that stresses the evolution of democratic
norms and institutions over time. Second, the Court's s. 3 jurisprudence
strengthens the notion that the Constitution protects the right of Canadians
to meaningfully participate in the democratic process. Applying a
purposive approach to interpretation, the Court has found that the right to
vote means more than simply marking a ballot in an election, but includes
a right to meaningful participation in the Canadian political process.
Indeed, the Court's conception of meaningful participation includes a
right to a minimum amount of information necessary to reflect the actual
preferences of voters. Finally, the Court's s. 3 jurisprudence reinforces
the understanding that the selection of representatives involves decisions
concerning the effectiveness of governance and the functioning of political
institutions in addition to decisions concerning policy choices.
Ref re: Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, ss. 14, 20 (Sask.)
The Supreme Court of Canada's process of defining the scope of the
right to vote began with a case concerning the proper size of electoral
constituencies, the Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference.95 As
this was the first case in which the Supreme Court had to deal with s. 3,
Justice McLachlin began her majority decision with a discussion of the
proper method of interpreting Charter rights. As part of this discussion,
Justice McLachlin discussed the role of historical conceptions of rights on
95. Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference, supra note 19. The case concerned revisions
to the electoral boundaries for the Province of Saskatchewan established by the Representation Act,
1989, S.S. 1989-90, c. R-20.2. In particular, the Court was asked to determine whether the distribution
of constituencies and the variance in population between constituencies allowed by the Act violated
s. 3 of the Charter. The Act mandated the creation of a fixed distribution of constituencies: 29 urban,
31 rural and 2 northern. As a result of the redistribution of constituencies, rural constituencies tended
to have smaller populations than urban constituencies. Under the Act population variances of up to 25
percent from the provincial quotient were permitted in southern constituencies and up to 50 percent in
the northern constituencies.
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) wrote the majority judgment for the Supreme Court. Justice
McLachlin held that the variance in constituency size allowed by the Act did not infringe s. 3. She
concluded that the purpose of section 3 was not to ensure equality ofvotingperse, but rather to ensure
"effective representation". Ensuring effective representation required consideration not just of parity
of voting power, but also consideration of factors such as geography, community history, community
interest and minority representation.
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contemporary constitutional interpretation. She rejected the notion that our.
understanding of rights must be frozen in a particular historical context.96
Justice McLachlin also recognized the primary -importance of
interpreting rights in light of the democratic context upon which they are
based: "Of final and critical importance to this appeal is the canon that in
interpreting the individual rights conferred by the Charter the Court must
be guided by the ideal of a "free and democratic society" upon which the
Charter is founded."97 Finally, Justice McLachlin reiterated her contention
in Dixon v. British Columbia (Attorney General) that the Canadian tradition
is one of "evolutionary democracy moving in uneven steps toward the goal
of universal suffrage and more effective representation..." 98
Justice McLachlin's discussion of the method of interpreting section
3 thus reinforced the fact that the principle of democracy in general,
and democratic rights in particular, though historically rooted, must
be understood as evolving over time. As noted earlier, this view was
supported by the entire court in the Quebec Secession Reference. This
notion of evolutionary democracy and the rejection of a frozen definition
of democratic rights is key to understanding how the interpretation of
democratic rights in Canada may be expanded over time to include a
right to access government information even though such a right was not
explicitly included in the text of the Charter in 1982. A parallel may be
drawn to the way in which the modem conception of the requirements of
effective democracy have changed over time from one based on a franchise
restricted, in large part, to able-bodied, white, property-owning males to
one that includes all adult citizens. In the same way, our conception of the
requirements of democratic governance has changed over time to include a
greater appreciation of the necessity of access to government information
to ensure the effectiveness of representative government.
Justice McLachlin also provided a useful description of "representative
democracy":
96. Ibid. at 32-33. Justice McLachlin stated:
The doctrine of the Constitution as a living tree mandates that narrow technical approaches
are to be eschewed: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinkeir (citations omitted)... It
also suggests that the past plays a critical but non-exclusive role in determining the content
of the rights and freedoms granted by the Charter. The tree is rooted in past and present
institutions, but must be capable of growth to meet the future...
The right to vote, while rooted in and hence to some extent defined by historical and
existing practices, cannot be viewed as frozen by particular historical anomalies. What
must be sought is the broader philosophy which is capable of explaining the past and
animating the future.
97. Ibid. at 33.
98. Ibid. at 37.
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Ours is a representative democracy. Each citizen is entitled to be
represented in government. Representation comprehends the idea of
having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the idea
of the right to bring one's grievances and concerns to the attention of
one's government representative; as noted in Dixon v. British Columbia
(Attorney General) (1989) 59 D.L.R. (4th) 247 at pp. 265-6, [1989] 4
W.W.R. 393, 35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (S.C.) elected representatives function
in two roles - legislative and what has been termed the "ombudsman
role". 99
The dual role of representation identified by Justice McLachlin reflects
the understanding that citizens have a right not just to participate in the
formation of public policy but also to raise comments and concerns
regarding the functioning of government institutions. Again, the ability
to raise such concerns is dependent on our access to information relating
to the functioning of those government institutions. The need for such
access has intensified over time as the scope of government activity has
expanded and become more complex.
Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)
The Supreme Court further considered the right to vote and the meaning
of the right to "effective representation" under s. 3 of the Charter in
Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer). As noted above, the Haig case
concerned a claim that provisions in the federal Referendum Act that
excluded certain persons from voting in a federal referendum violated his
rights under sections 2(b), 3 and 15 of the Charter.
In her majority judgment Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 concluded that
section 3 of the Charter did not include a constitutional right to vote in
a referendum.' 0 She found that the right to vote itself did not extend
beyond the right to vote in "elections of representatives of the federal
and provincial legislative assemblies."'' Nonetheless, she highlighted
the fact, identified by Justice McLachlin in the Saskatchewan Electoral
Boundaries Reference, that the interpretation of the right to vote must
consider the democratic context that is its foundation. In her view, "in a
democratic society, the right to vote as expressed in s. 3 must be given
a content commensurate with those values embodied in a democratic
state."' 0 2 As such, her analysis of the right to vote was informed by
the principle of democracy, which includes the recognition of a right
99. Ibid. at 35.
100. 1 dealt with Justice L'Heureux-Dubd's reasons concerning s. 2(b) of the Charter above. I will
deal with her treatment of s. 3 in this section.
101. Haig, supra note 64 at 600.
102. Ibid.
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to effective representation. According to Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, the
right to effective representation protected by section 3 of the Charter
includes the right to play a meaningful role in the selection of elected
representatives.10 3
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 also noted that the democratic rights
enshrined in sections 3-5 of the Charter impose positive obligations on
governments to hold elections.' This is significant in the context of access
to government information because, as noted ear!ier, providing access to
government information is often portrayed as requiring the state to accept
positive obligations. Without conceding that a right to access government
information should be characterized as a positive obligation, recognizing
a right to access government information as part of s. 3 would avoid the
argument against imposing positive obligations on government through s.
2(b) of the Charter
Figueroa v. Canada
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's concept of a right to meaningful participation
in the electoral process was further developed in Figueroa v. Canada.'°5
Figueroa concerned a challenge to the Canada Elections Act 10 6 by the leader
of the Communist Party of Canada. In particular, Figueroa challenged the
provisions of the Act that prohibited candidates from parties that failed to
field 50 candidates in a federal election from issuing tax receipts outside of
the election period, transferring unspent election funds to their party (rather
than remitting them to the government) and listing their party affiliation on
the election ballot.17 He argued that the provisions violated sections 2(b),
3 and 15 of the Charter.
All nine members of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the
provisions infringed section 3 of the Charter and that the infringement
could not be justified under section 1.108 Justice lacobucci noted at the
outset of his majority reasons that the appeal raised "fundamental questions
103. Ibid. Justice L'Heureux-Dube stated:
The purpose of s. 3 of the Charter is, then, to grant every citizen of this country the right
to play a meaningful role in the selection of elected representatives who, in turn, will be
responsible for making decisions embodied in legislation for which they will be accountable
to their electorate.
104. Ibid. at 601.
105. [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, 227 D.L.R. (41) 1 [Figueroa, cited to D.L.R.].
106. Canada Elections Act, supra note 69.
107. Ibid., ss. 24(2), 24(3), 28(2).
108. The majority decision written by Justice lacobucci and concurred with by five other judges,
differed from the minority, written by Justice LeBel, over the precise method of interpreting section 3,
but not in the result. I will focus here on the reasons of the majority.
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in respect of the democratic process in our country."' 109 He noted, however,
that the right to effective representation protected by s. 3 extends beyond
simply voting to include the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role
in the electoral process."t0 In particular, Justice lacobucci held that section
3 guaranteed a certain level of participation - meaningful participation - in
the electoral process, rather than a specific type of electoral outcome."'
He found that participation in the electoral process had intrinsic value
independent of the impact of that participation on the actual outcome
of the election." 2 This value was related to the importance of different
perspectives and opinions in enriching the political debate that is the
lifeblood of an open society. 13 Justice lacobucci's majority reasons thus
advanced the proposition that democratic rights should be interpreted so
as to enhance the quality of democracy in Canada. This suggests that the
important link between access to government information and democratic
participation and democratic accountability should play an important role
in the interpretation of the Constitution in general and the right to vote in
particular.
Justice lacobucci emphasized that elections are important as the
primary means by which average citizens participate in political debate
and the determination of social policy." 4 He also noted that the right
to meaningful participation included both a right to comment on the
formation of policy and the right to comment on the functioning of public
institutions."5 Justice Iacobucci reiterated this point later when discussing
the role of political parties in the Canadian political system:
In respect of their ability to act as an effective outlet for the meaningful
participation of individual citizens in the electoral process, the
participation of political parties in the electoral process also provides
109. Figueroa, supra note 105 at 9.
110. Ibid. at 19.
11I. Ibid. He stated:
On its very face, then, the central focus of s. 3 is the right of each citizen to participate in the
electoral process. This signifies that the right of each citizen to participate in the political
life of the country is one that is of fundamental importance in a free and democratic
society and suggests that s. 3 should be interpreted in a manner that ensures that this right
of participation embraces a content commensurate with the importance of individual
participation in the selection of elected representatives in a free and democratic state.
112. Ibid. at 20.
113. Ibid. at 19-20. Justice lacobucci stated: "Defining the purpose of s. 3 with reference to the right of
each citizen to meaningful participation in the electoral process, best reflects the capacity of individual
participation in the electoral process to enhance the quality of democracy in this country."
114. Ibid. at 20-21.
115. Ibid. at 21. Justice lacobucci stated : "In each instance, the democratic rights entrenched in s. 3
ensure that each citizen has an opportunity to express an opinion about the formation of social policy
and the functioning of public institutions through participation in the electoral process."
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individuals with the opportunity to express an opinion on governmental
policy and the proper functioning of public institutions." 6
Justice Iacobucci concluded that the purpose of section 3 was not limited to
ensuring the participation in the electoral process but also extended to the
right to participate in the larger political process of the country: "Absent
such a right, ours would not be a true democracy. '""7
Justice Iacobucci's majority reasons in Figueroa reinforced the
conception that section 3 includes a right to meaningful participation
in the electoral process in particular and in the political process more
generally. Justice lacobucci specifically identified the importance of
access to information in order to render participation in the electoral
process meaningful. In his view, without access to sufficient information
concerning the candidates, citizens could not ensure that their votes reflect
their preferences. "'
Justice Iacobucci's recognition of the necessity of access to information
concerning political candidates in order to ensure that citizens may exercise
their right to vote in a manner that accurately reflects their preferences
applies equally to the necessity of access to information concerning
government activity. The fact that access to government information may
be necessary in certain circumstances in order to ensure that the actual
preferences of citizens are reflected when they vote, particularly when
they use their votes to pass judgment on issues of governance and the
functioning of political institutions, thus offers strong support for the
protection of a constitutional right to access government information
under section 3 of the Charter.
116. Ibid. at 26.
117. Ibid. at 21.
118. Ibid. at 30. Justice lacobucci stated:
The right to play a meaningful role in the electoral process includes the right of each citizen
to exercise the right to vote in a manner that accurately reflects his or her preferences. In
order to exercise the right to vote in this manner, citizens must be able to assess the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each party, voters must have access to information about each
candidate. As a consequence, legislation that exacerbates a pre-existing disparity in the
capacity of various political parties to communicate their positions to the general public is
inconsistent with s. 3. This, however, is precisely the effect of withholding from political
parties that have not satisfied the 50-candidate threshold the right to issue tax receipts
for donations received outside the election period and the right to retain unspent election
funds. By derogating from the capacity of marginal or regional parties to present their ideas
and opinions to the general public, it undermines the right of each citizen to information
that might influence the manner in which she or he exercises the right to vote.
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Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)
The content of the right to effective representation under s. 3 of the
Charter was further explored in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General). As
noted above, the Harper case involved a claim that spending restrictions
on citizens and groups during the course of an election campaign violated
sections 2(b), 2(d) and 3 of the Charter.
Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority, noted at the outset of
his reasons that "the right to free expression and the right to vote are
distinct rights." 9 He rejected the argument that the right to meaningful
participation included a right to unimpeded and unlimited electoral debate
and expression. He recognized that the s. 3 right to vote included a right to
meaningful participation in the electoral process and indeed meaningful
participation in the political process. The salutary effects of such
participation were also recognized: "Greater participation in the political
discourse leads to a wider expression of beliefs and opinions and results
in an enriched political debate, thereby enhancing the quality of Canada's
democracy."' 12° This reinforces the position adapted by Justice lacobucci
in Figueroa that democratic rights should be interpreted so as to increase
the effectiveness of the democratic process.
Justice Bastarache noted that the issue raised in the Harper case was
the right of the citizen to exercise their vote in an informed manner.
This -case engages the informational component of an individual's
right to meaningfully participate in the electoral process. The right to
meaningful participation includes a citizen's right to exercise his or
her vote in an informed manner. For a voter to be well-informed, the
citizen must be able to weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses
of each candidate and political party. The citizen must also be able to
consider opposing aspects of issues associated with certain candidates
and political parties where they exist. In short, the voter has'a right to
be "reasonably informed of all the possible choices": Libman, at para.
47.121
Justice Bastarache held that, in order to protect the right to an informed
vote, there had to be limits on the information disseminated by third parties,
candidates and political parties. In particular, he found that spending
limits ensured that affluent individuals or groups pooling their resources
would not dominate the political discourse. He concluded that equality
in the political discourse thereby promoted the right to vote, while an
119. Harper, supra note 74 at 228.
120. Ibid. at 229.
121. Ibid.
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unlimited right to convey information or opinions may undermine that
right. 22 Nonetheless, Justice Bastarache did recognize that limitations on
access to information may infringe the right to vote in circumstances where
those limitations undermined the right to meaningfully participate in the
electoral process. In his words: "To constitute an infringement of the right
to vote, these spending limits would have to restrict information in such a
way as to undermine the right of citizens to meaningfully participate in the
political process and to be effectively represented."'23
The argument I am proposing is that the right to meaningfully
participate in the political process requires not just access to information
provided by political parties, but also access to information concerning the
actions of government; this follows from Justice lacobucci's discussion
in Figueroa. Without such information, citizens cannot adequately weigh
the strengths and weaknesses, or more appropriately, the positives and
negatives of government policies and practices.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly identified the requirement that
citizens have adequate information to make informed choices when voting
and otherwise participating in the political system. The ability of voters
to make "informed" choices is necessary to ensure that the choices made
reflect the actual preferences of voters. If voters' choices don't reflect
their actual preferences then the democratic process becomes seriously
undermined. Although the Court has not yet explicitly linked the need to
have adequate information to make informed choices when voting to a
right to access government information, the linkage is easily made.
Recall that the Supreme Court has identified two primary focuses
of voter choice and participation in the democratic process: policy and
governance. In the first instance, voters make choices concerning policy
options provided by particular candidates or political parties; they may also
seek to participate in the formation of government policy. In the second
instance, voters may also make choices concerning issues of governance,
including the performance of government institutions and the behaviour
of government officials. Discussion and debate concerning policy options
may be possible, at a basic level, when relying simply on the publications
and pronouncements of political parties and candidates for political office
122. Ibid. at 230. He stated:
In this way, equality in the political discourse is necessary for meaningful participation
in the electoral process and ultimately enhances the right to vote. Therefore, contrary to
the respondent's submission, s. 3 does not guarantee a right to unlimited information or
unlimited participation.
123. This had been noted by both the majority reasons of Bastarache and the dissenting reasons of
Justice Gonthier in Thomson Newspapers.
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since parties and candidates have some interest in providing sufficient
information to convince voters to select them based on that information.
The sincerity of the information provided may be suspect, of course,
however voters will be able to hold the parties or candidates accountable
in a future election for their failure to fulfill campaign promises concerning
policy issues. More meaningful participation requires accurate and detailed
information.
Discussion and debate concerning the functioning and performance
of government institutions is not possible, at even a basic level, without
a right of access to government information since it is precisely access
to information concerning failures in administration or misbehaviour
of government officials that is likely to be denied. It would be virtually
impossible for voters to make informed choices concerning the
performance of a government without access to information concerning the
government's behaviour. In the absence of such information, it is possible,
indeed likely, that voter choices concerning issues of governance and
institutional performance (namely a choice of whether or not to re-elect
a governing party or candidate) will fail to reflect the actual preferences
of voters. As such, restrictions on access to government information may
indeed undermine the rights of citizens to meaningfully participate in
the political process and to be effectively represented. Such restrictions
should constitute infringements of the right to vote protected by section 3
of the Charter.
VI. Hypothetical scenario: applying the Charter to protect access to
cabinet confidences
To this point, I have largely focused on the arguments in favour of
recognizing a constitutional right to access government information
through application of the principle of democracy in the process of
constitutional interpretation. However, it is important to recognize that
there are important values and interests that must be considered and
weighed against the right of access to government information. In this
regard, it is notable that all of the legislative access regimes in Canada
include important limitations on access to certain types of government
information, such as information concerning national security, national
defence, different aspects of the policy-making process and individual
privacy. Indeed, the legitimacy of such limitations is generally accepted
(to varying degrees) by most access advocates.
Certainly, I would also agree that a constitutional right to access
protected by the Charter would have to accommodate certain legitimate
limitations. Indeed, in my view, a Charter right to access would most
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likely accommodate the majority of existing statutory limitations on
access to government information. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate
how such a Charter right may recognize such legitimate limitations
is to consider how such a right may be applied to a specific legislative
provision. In this section, then, I will consider a hypothetical scenario in
which legislation restricting access to government information may be
challenged for violating the right to access I have argued is embedded
within sections 2(b) and 3 of the Charter. In particular, I will focus on how
an infringement on the proposed right to access may be justified under
section 1 of the Charter.1
24
One hypothetical scenario where legislation restricting access to
government information may be challenged for violating a constitutional
right to access government information arises out of the mandatory
exemption of Cabinet confidences from disclosure under the Ontario
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. 25 Section 12 of
FOIPPA requires that government officials must refuse to disclose records
124. For the purpose of this article, I will not engage in any discussion of the level of deference to be
accorded to the government in the analysis or the types of evidence required to support the section 1
argument.
125. Supra note 12.
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that would reveal the substance of Cabinet deliberations unless the record
is 20 years old or Cabinet consents to its disclosure. 26
The first consideration when assessing whether a legislative provision
restricting access to information violates the proposed constitutional right
of access to information is whether access to the information at issue is
protected by either section 2(b) or section 3 of the Charter Arguably, the
scope of access protected may differ depending on the Charter provision
relied upon. I have argued that the Charter should be interpreted to
protect a right to access government information that is necessary to allow
citizens to engage in meaningful participation in the political process. We
have seen that the Supreme Court's section 3 jurisprudence indicates that
meaningful participation in the political process must at least include the
ability to make informed decisions when voting such that one's actual
preferences may be reflected when voting. This suggests that section 3
of the Charter would protect at least access to government information
necessary to evaluate the performance of government in the determination
and implementation of government policy.2 7 This information is vital
for citizens to be able to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of the
government.
126. Section 12 states:
A head shall refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure would reveal the substance of
deliberations of the Executive Council or its committees, including,
(a) an agenda, minute or other record of the deliberations or decisions of the
Executive Council or its committees;
(b) a record containing policy options or recommendations submitted, or prepared
for submission, to the Executive Council or its committees;
(c) a record that does not contain policy options or recommendations referred to in
clause (b) and that does contain background explanations or analyses of problems
submitted, or prepared for submission, to the Executive Council or its committees
for their consideration in making decisions, before those decisions are made and
implemented;
(d) a record used for or reflecting consultation among ministers of the Crown on
matters relating to the making of government decisions or the formulation of
government policy;
(e) a record prepared to brief a minister of the Crown in relation to matters that
are before or are proposed to be brought before the Executive Council or its
committees, or are the subject of consultations among ministers relating to
government decisions or the formulation of government policy; and
(0 draft legislation or regulations. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 12 (I).
Exception
(2) Despite subsection (I), a head shall not refuse under subsection (1) to disclose a record
where,
(a) the record is more than twenty years old; or
(b) the Executive Council for which, or in respect of which, the record has been
prepared consents to access being given. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 12 (2).
127. Such a right may not require contemporaneous release of information, as long as the information
was available prior to the next election.
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However, the Court's jurisprudence also suggests that participation
in the political process may extend beyond the act of voting to include
participation in the policy-making process through public discussion and
debate. This broader definition of political participation would more
likely be accommodated under s. 2(b) than under s. 3 of the Charter. In
light of this, it is possible that a right to access government information
protected by section 2(b) of the Charter may have a broader scope than
a similar right protected by section 3 of the Charter. However, it is also
worth noting that the Court may determine that the scope of access to
information protected under section 2(b) should be narrowed in order to
focus on information vital to the electoral process.
A full consideration of the specific types of information to be
protected under a Charter- based right to access government information,
though important, is beyond the scope of this article. As such, for the
purpose of this section, I will focus on a possible section 3 claim against
section 12 of FOIPPA. The first stage of the analysis, then, is to consider
whether the mandatory exemption of access to Cabinet secrets under the
section triggers the right of access protected by section 3 of the Charter
The issue to be determined is thus whether the restriction of access to
Cabinet confidences infringes the right to vote by restricting the ability of
citizens to make informed decisions when voting. Certainly, information
concerning the potential policy options considered by Cabinet when
making decisions, the content of debate concerning Cabinet decisions
and the resulting decisions are all types of information that would assist
citizens in the process of holding their elected officials accountable. What
better way to assess the performance of a government than to know exactly
which policy alternatives were considered and the reasons one particular
alternative was chosen over others? As such, a restriction of access to
Cabinet confidences would certainly trigger the proposed constitutional
right to access government information.
The second stage of the analysis, then, is to consider whether the
restriction of the right to access information may be justified under section
1 of the Charter. This requires a consideration of the factors outlined in
the Oakes test. 28
128. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. Briefly stated, the Oakes test, or guidelines, require that
the government demonstrate the following: (1) that the objective of the limitation is pressing and
substantial; (2) that the limitation must be proportionate, including: (a) that the limitation is rationally
connected to the objective of the limitation; (b) that the limitation minimally impairs the Charter right
at issue; and (3) that the detrimental impact of the limitation on the Charter right is outweighed by the
benefit achieved by the limitation.
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Once it is affirmed that the restriction on the right access is 'prescribed
by law', the first stage of the Oakes test requires that the government
demonstrate that the objective of the restriction is 'pressing and substantial'.
The Supreme Court has had a number of opportunities to discuss the
objectives behind the exemption or exclusion of Cabinet confidences from
legislative disclosure requirements as such restrictions on access have been
challenged a number of tiMies in the context of evidence legislation.12 9
In most cases, the exclusion of Cabinet confidence is justified, in part,
by the fact that deliberations of the Cabinet are to remain confidential and
all decisions are to be represented as decisions of a unified body. It is this
requirement of confidentiality of Cabinet decision-making process that
has been one of the most prevalent historical justifications for insulating
Cabinet confidences from disclosure. Additional arguments in favour of the
insulation of Cabinet confidences include the need to prevent capricious
interference with the process of governance.
The protection of Cabinet confidences against disclosure in judicial
proceedings and Access to Information proceedings has long roots in
the history of the Canadian legal system. Historically, even the decision
to declare a record as a Cabinet confidence was insulated from judicial
review at common law such that judges were not permitted to review
alleged Cabinet confidences. Over time, many of the reasons for insulating
decisions concerning the disclosure Cabinet confidences from any type of
judicial review were rejected by both English and Canadian courts and the
absolute immunity of Cabinet confidences from judicial review was eroded
at common law. 3' However, that absolute immunity was later reinstated
by legislation protecting the disclosure of Cabinet confidences in judicial
proceedings.' 3 ' This insulation of Cabinet confidences was reflected in
their exemption from disclosure under s. 12 of FOIPPA.
While many of the historical justifications for shielding decisions
concerning whether information is properly considered to contain Cabinet
confidences from any judicial review have been discredited, the basic
contention that Cabinet confidences should be protected from disclosure
in order to protect the system of responsible government remains largely
uncontested. As a result, there is a strong argument that the restriction of
access to Cabinet confidences fulfills a pressing and substantial objective.
129. See, for example, Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3, (2002), 214 D.L.R.
(4"1) 193 [Babcock].
130. For a discussion of the evolution of the common law treatment of this issue see: Carey v. Ontario
(1986), 35 D. L.R. (4-') 161 (S.C.C.) [Carey]. See also, R. v. Snider, [ 1954] S.C.R. 479, [1954] 4 D.L.R.
483; Smallwood v. Sparling, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 686, 141 D.L.R. (3d) 395.
131. Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2"' Supp.), c. 10, s. 41.
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There is similarly a strong argument that a mandatory exemption of records
containing Cabinet confidences from disclosure is 'rationally connected' to
the pressing and substantial objective of protecting the efficacy of Cabinet
deliberations. Certainly, there is a good argument that refusing access to
the Cabinet secrets would promote Cabinet confidentiality and thereby
improve the efficacy of Cabinet deliberations.
The more difficult aspect of the section 1 justification would be to
demonstrate that the mandatory exemption from disclosure is a minimal
impairment of the right to access information protected by section 3 of the
Charter At this stage of the analysis, it may be argued that a mandatory
exemption of all records submitted to Cabinet, including briefing notes
and policy papers, is overly broad and should be more carefully tailored.
However, it could also be argued that the mandatory exemption embodied
in section 12 of FOIPPA is less restrictive than the complete exclusion
of Cabinet confidences from the ambit of the federal Access Act., 32 This
complete exclusion, pursuant to section 69 of the federal Access Act, means
that determinations of whether a record contains Cabinet confidences is
not reviewable by the Information Commissioner of Canada.
Interestingly, not even the Information Commissioner of Canada has
advocated that Cabinet confidences be subject to unlimited disclosure
under the federal Access Act. Rather, the Information Commissioner has
suggested that the federal Access Act be amended to include a mandatory
exception for Cabinet confidences as opposed to a complete exclusion of
this information from the ambit of the Act.'33 This proposed change to
section 69 of the Access Act would mean that decisions concerning whether
or not particular information includes Cabinet confidences and should
be exempted from disclosure would be reviewable by the Information
Commissioner, and ultimately the courts, based on a review of the
information itself. However, information properly certified as containing
Cabinet confidences would be subject to a mandatory exemption from
disclosure. Ultimately, this would bring the federal Access Act into line
with the approach set out in Ontario's FOIPPA.
Assuming that the Court found that the mandatory exemption of
Cabinet records from disclosure pursuant to s. 12 of FOIPPA passed the
minimal impairment stage of the analysis, the government would also
132. Supra note 4.
133. Information Commissioner of Canada, Proposed Changes to the Access to Information Act,
online: <http://www.infocom.gc.ca/specialreports/pdf/Access-to Information Act -_changesSept_
28 2005E.pdf.> The Information Commissioner has also proposed that all decisions of Cabinet
be disclosable four years after the decisions have been taken. In addition, he has proposed some
modifications and clarifications to the definition of Cabinet confidences contained in the Act.
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have to demonstrate that benefits achieved through the protection of the
efficacy of Cabinet governance outweighed the deleterious effects of
the restriction on the right of access imposed through the section. Here,
the Court would have to consider whether the requirement that Cabinet
confidences be protected from disclosure in order to protect the principle
of responsible government outweighs the interest in access to this
information as a mechanism for improving political accountability and
political participation.
Ultimately, in my view, it will be possible for the government to justify
at least certain restrictions on access to Cabinet confidences, although it
may be more difficult to justify a complete exclusion of all documents
provided to Cabinet from disclosure requirements. The importance of
protecting decision-making process would prove a heavy, though not
insurmountable, counter-balance to the interests in access. Indeed, it
is likely that the vast majority of the existing legislative exemptions to
disclosure requirements would be upheld as constitutionally valid if a
Charter right to access government information is recognized. Certainly,
existing restrictions on access to information that have been implemented
in order to protect national security or national defence,'34 the policy-
making process' and personal privacy'36 would be supported by robust
justifications under a section 1 analysis. Thus while a constitutional
protection of access to government information is both desirable and
justifiable, its impact would most likely be felt where current legislative
restrictions on access are increased or existing protections of access are
repealed.
Conclusion
The framers of the Constitution proved reluctant to entrench a constitutional
right to access government information in 1982 in part out of a belief that
a legislative framework should precede consideration of constitutional
entrenchment. That framework has been in place for more than a quarter
century. More importantly, recognition of the importance of access to the
effectiveness of the democratic process has grown exponentially in -the
intervening years. Indeed, the necessity of providing access to government
information to ensure government accountability and meaningful
democratic participation has been identified, in principle, by academics,
134. See, for example, s. 15 of the federal Access Act.
135. See, for example, s. 21 of the federal Access Act.
136. See, for example, s. 19 of the federal Access Act. I note that in so far as claims of personal privacy
may trigger the Charter rights or interests of other individuals, the process of balancing privacy rights
against access rights may occur outside of the s. I analysis.
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judges, international organizations and even the Canadian government.
This recognition has paralleled the rising expectations of citizens that they
enjoy meaningful participation in the political process. At a minimum, this
includes a growing expectation that they have sufficient information to
make informed choices when selecting their elected representatives.
Unfortunately, the importance of access to government information to
the democratic process has not always been recognized in practice. Failure
to provide access to the government information necessary to allow citizens
to make informed choices not only undermines the effectiveness of the
democratic process, it undermines its legitimacy. One of the fundamental
roles of the Canadian Constitution is to provide the necessary framework
for effective democratic governance. While much of the framework of
democratic governance has been shaped by Canadian legislatures, courts
have a responsibility to intervene where the actions of the government are
responsible for undermining the democratic process. One way in which
courts may fulfill this responsibility is by ensuring that the interpretation
of the Constitution ensures adequate protection of that process.
Consistent with this role and with its broad and purposive approach to
constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted
s. 2(b) and s. 3 of the Charter generously, recognizing the importance of
both expression and voting to the realization of a meaningful democratic
process in Canada. In its jurisprudence, the Court has reinforced the
recognition of the importance of political debate and discussion to the
democratic process. It has underlined the need for access to information to
support the ability of citizens to make informed choices when voting and
to support their right to be able to meaningfully participate in the political
process, whether it be concerning issues of policy or governance.
The principle of democracy has provided the foundation for the Supreme
Court's interpretation of sections 2(b) and 3. A proper consideration of
the principle suggests that it also provides the necessary foundation to
extend the scope of s. 2(b) and s. 3 to ensure that citizens have access to
government information necessary to ensure their meaningful participation
in the democratic process. Of course, such a right to access information
would not be absolute. Rather, the imposition of reasonable limits on the
right to access in order to protect important values and interests such as
the efficacy of government decision-making and policy-development,
national security and national defence to name a few, would be justifiable
through section 1 of the Charter Ultimately, interpreting the Charter in a
way that protects access to government information ensures that citizens,
not just academics, have something to talk about.

